Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$5.9B
$1.2B
$2.0B
$1.3B
15.7%
20.0%
—
$1.0B
2017
$7.3B
$1.7B
$2.7B
$1.8B
20.0%
23.2%
—
$2.3B
2018
$9.0B
$2.6B
$3.8B
$2.7B
27.7%
28.7%
—
$1.6B
2019
$11.2B
$3.0B
$4.0B
$3.3B
28.0%
26.4%
$989.0M
$2.6B
2020
$12.9B
$5.3B
$5.3B
$5.6B
39.7%
40.9%
$4.1B
$4.5B
2021
$15.8B
$4.8B
$6.9B
$5.3B
32.6%
30.5%
$4.1B
$3.8B
2022
$17.6B
$4.8B
$7.4B
$5.2B
33.8%
27.0%
$3.6B
$4.2B
2023
$19.4B
$5.4B
$6.9B
$5.9B
32.9%
28.0%
$3.6B
$7.1B
2024
$21.5B
$5.6B
$7.9B
$6.2B
39.4%
25.9%
$4.1B
$7.6B
2025
$23.8B
$7.1B
$9.9B
$7.8B
61.3%
30.0%
$6.2B
$5.4B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
ADOBE INC. (ADBE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Moat is real. Once a design team or enterprise embeds Photoshop, Premiere, Acrobat, and the API layer into their workflow, leaving means months of chaos. The 99%+ subscription renewal rate proves it’s a utility, not a discretionary tool. Switching costs are vicious.
Economics are exceptional. FCF of $9.9B on $23.8B revenue — that’s a 41.6% FCF margin. Incremental cost on each new subscription is near zero. ROE of 61.3% is fueled by buybacks, but the underlying business prints cash even after debt service.
Pricing power is alive. Net margin oscillated but remains 30% despite inflation and competition. Adobe raises subscription prices annually and churn stays near zero. That’s a tax on the creative world.
AI is an opportunity, not a death sentence. Firefly is integrated into the Creative Cloud. If Adobe embeds generative AI inside the toolchain, it raises switching costs even higher. The installed base is the distribution channel.
Attractive entry price? The DCF values the business at $355.71/share (8% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal). If the market panics on AI fears and the stock drops to $267 (25% margin of safety), it’s a no-brainer. At $178 (50% margin), you’d be buying a cash machine with a compounding moat for half of fair value — classic Buffett territory.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Invert, always invert.” Here are the three ways Adobe permanently impairs — not a recession, not a bad quarter, but structural death.
Generative AI bypasses the toolchain. If a marketer can type “make a 30-second product video” and get a YouTube-ready output from a standalone AI (e.g., Sora, Midjourney, Canva Magic Studio), Adobe’s suite becomes optional. New businesses never adopt the workflow — no lock-in. Over 10–15 years, the high-end base shrinks as the low-end ecosystem vanishes.
Debt leverage + churn acceleration = death spiral. Adobe borrowed $6.2B to buy back stock, not invest in R&D. If AI tools steal low-end users, churn ticks from 3% to 8%. FCF drops. Debt service becomes a drag. ROE collapses from leverage unwind. The stock gets re-rated to a utility multiple.
Figma’s blocking reveals acquisition desperation. They tried to buy Figma for $20B and got blocked. That signals organic growth is slowing. Without a new sticky platform, the moat narrows faster than expected. Management’s only lever is more debt-funded buybacks — a trap.
Most likely scenario: AI erosion happens gradually — 10–15 years. The high-end professional base (video editors, print designers) holds. But the long tail of casual users (Canva refugees) never returns. Adobe becomes a slow-growth, high-margin cash cow — not a compounder. Current debt makes that scenario worse.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| DCF intrinsic value (per share) | $355.71 |
| Current market price (approx.) | $450 (as of mid‑2025) |
| Upside / downside | –21% (expensive vs. intrinsic) |
| 25% margin of safety entry | $266.78 |
| 50% margin of safety entry (Buffett’s ideal) | $177.86 |
Verdict on current price:Expensive. The DCF already assumes 8% FCF growth and a 10% discount rate — optimistic. At $450, you’re paying for a moat that is narrowing, not widening. No margin of safety.
If the stock drops to $267: You get a 25% buffer against a slow erosion scenario. Worth a consideration.
At $178: You’re buying a business that prints $9.9B FCF for ~18x FCF. Even if the moat narrows, that’s cheap for a cash machine. That’s the price where Buffett would write a cheque.
Verdict: WATCH
The business is exceptional — high switching costs, absurd margins, and a $9.9B cash printer — but the current price offers no margin of safety, debt-funded buybacks add fragility, and the moat is slowly leaking low-end users to AI. Wait for a price below $270 (25% margin of safety) or a clearer signal that Firefly turns AI into a moat-widener instead of a bypass. At $450, the risk of permanent impairment outweighs the upside.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.