Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$52.4B
-$849.0M
—
—
-1.1%
-1.6%
$30.9B
—
2017
$49.5B
-$6.1B
—
—
-9.3%
-12.3%
$31.6B
—
2018
$47.4B
-$6.0M
—
—
-0.0%
-0.0%
$34.5B
—
2019
$49.7B
$3.3B
—
—
5.1%
6.7%
$35.4B
—
2020
$43.7B
-$5.9B
—
—
-9.0%
-13.6%
$37.5B
—
2021
$52.2B
$10.4B
—
—
15.9%
19.9%
$30.2B
—
2022
$30.0B
$10.2B
—
—
25.0%
34.1%
$27.2B
—
2023
$27.9B
$3.6B
—
—
8.0%
13.0%
$10.6B
—
2024
$27.3B
-$1.4B
—
—
-3.3%
-5.2%
$8.9B
—
2025
$26.8B
$3.1B
—
—
7.5%
11.6%
$9.2B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (AIG) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Looking for the diamond in the rough, but finding mostly rough.
The Float Engine: AIG is a massive reservoir of float. If management can pivot to disciplined, low-cost underwriting, they possess a capital base that would take a competitor decades to build.
Scale as a Weapon: In a commodity business, size allows for diversified risk. They can take hits in one geography or line of business that would bankrupt a smaller player.
The "Cleanup" Play: The current divestiture spree is painful but necessary. If they successfully strip away the low-margin deadwood, we are left with a leaner, more focused insurance machine.
The Price of Admission: This becomes attractive only if the market prices it as a liquidation rather than a going concern.
Attractive Entry: Genuinely interesting if it hits the $20–$25 range, where the book value and float provide a hard floor.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
"Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."
The "Slow Bleed" Liquidation: Management isn't scaling; they are retreating. Revenue has collapsed from $52.4B to $26.8B. This isn't a "strategic pivot"—it's a managed decline. They are selling the furniture to pay the mortgage.
The Reserve Time-Bomb: Insurance is an exercise in estimation. With net income swinging from $10.4B to $1.4B losses, the "quality" of their earnings is fictional. A single systemic catastrophic event or a miscalculation in long-tail reserves could permanently impair the equity.
The Commodity Trap: Without a cost advantage, AIG is just a giant target. They lack the brand loyalty of a GEICO or the specialized niche of a Lloyd's; they are a generalist in a world where generalists get squeezed.
Most Likely Death: The Slow Bleed. Over the next 5–10 years, they continue to shrink into a mediocre rump company with no growth engine and a legacy of expensive liabilities.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF assumes a -7.5% FCF growth rate—that is not an investment; that is a countdown.
Intrinsic value estimate: $41.77 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $31.33(Conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $20.89(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Expensive. If the market price is above $41.77, we are paying for growth that the business is explicitly not delivering. We are buying a shrinking asset at a premium.
Verdict: PASS
The business is in a state of structural retreat with volatile, low-quality earnings. There is no durable moat here, only a regulatory fence and a shrinking pile of premiums. At a DCF of $41.77, there is no margin of safety to justify the risk of a permanent capital impairment.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.