Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
–Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$567.7M
$320.7M
$690.9M
$474.1M
9.8%
56.5%
—
$324.2M
2017
$609.2M
$222.8M
$546.8M
$340.9M
6.6%
36.6%
—
$313.4M
2018
$2.7B
$298.4M
$790.7M
$515.3M
9.3%
11.0%
—
$1.0B
2019
$2.9B
$478.0M
$698.6M
$559.0M
13.1%
16.5%
—
$393.7M
2020
$3.2B
$557.1M
$700.7M
$521.1M
13.1%
17.4%
—
$352.9M
2021
$3.5B
$651.6M
$1.1B
$873.3M
14.4%
18.8%
—
$536.7M
2022
$3.6B
$523.7M
$1.0B
$875.2M
12.0%
14.5%
—
$542.3M
2023
$3.8B
$547.6M
$890.5M
$660.5M
11.9%
14.4%
—
$489.5M
2024
$4.0B
$504.9M
$1.1B
$762.9M
10.4%
12.7%
—
$517.7M
2025
$4.2B
$452.0M
$1.0B
$652.9M
9.1%
10.7%
—
$930.2M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC (AKAM) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Why is the moat durable and why does it compound?
The moat was switching costs — custom integrations, multi-year contracts, and a network that beats hyperscalers on latency. That still exists, but it’s eroding. The only genuine durable edge left is the security business: Akamai’s edge-based DDoS and WAF are harder to replicate than a CDN. If that segment grows fast enough, the whole company could re-rate. FCF consistently exceeds net income ($1.0B vs $0.5B in 2025), meaning cash generation is real and buybacks are shrinking the share count ~2% annually — a compounding tailwind if profitability ever stabilizes.
What makes the economics exceptional — specifically?
Nothing exceptional today. Revenue is $4.2B, net income is only $0.5B (10.7% margin — down from 56.5% nine years ago). The only exceptional number is zero debt and $1.0B FCF — a cash machine that is temporarily broken on profitability. If management stops empire-building and focuses on margin recovery (e.g., retiring low-margin CDN legacy contracts), FCF could grow faster than the DCF’s 7.7% assumption.
At what price range does this become genuinely attractive to Berkshire?
Only if the market prices it as a dying utility. A 25% margin of safety on the DCF ($109/share) gives a reasonable entry — but that still relies on avoiding the structural bear case. To get Buffett’s 50% margin of safety ($73/share), you’d need to believe CDN is a zero-margin commodity and security alone can’t save the ship. That’s a deep value price that compensates for real risk of permanent impairment.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
2–3 structural, permanent threats that impair the business:
Hyperscaler CDN commoditization — AWS CloudFront, Google Cloud, and Cloudflare offer CDN as a free add-on to compute/storage. Akamai’s pricing power evaporates. The net margin collapse from 56.5% to 10.7% is the early symptom. Within 10 years, CDN becomes a zero-margin commodity, and Akamai’s revenue mix (still heavily weighted to Delivery) turns profitable only by accident.
Security commoditization — Cloudflare, Fastly, and even AWS Shield are eating Akamai’s security lunch. Cloudflare’s network is growing faster, its pricing is simpler, and its developer ecosystem is stickier. Akamai’s security margins are already under pressure; ROE fell from 14.4% (2021) to 9.1% (2025) — capital is earning mediocre returns.
Acquisition hangover — Akamai bought Fermyon, Noname, Edgio, Lumen, StackPath. Each deal promised “synergies” but net income stayed flat at ~$0.5B for three years while revenue grew. Management is buying growth, not compounders. If any of these deals write down goodwill, the balance sheet gets messy (currently zero debt, but goodwill is sizable).
Most likely scenario: Commoditization wins. The 10.7% net margin becomes 5% by 2030. Akamai survives as a niche security vendor but never returns to its glory days. Share price drifts down to $80–$90 on stagnant earnings — and the DCF’s 3% terminal growth becomes a fantasy.
25% margin of safety entry:$109.10/share — conservative, but only if you believe margins can stop falling.
50% margin of safety entry:$72.73/share — Buffett’s ideal, pricing in the bear case.
Current price: Not provided in the analysis. If AKAM trades above $145, it is expensive — the DCF already assumes optimistic FCF growth that the business hasn’t delivered. If it trades below $109, it starts to look cheap if you trust management to fix margins. Below $73, it’s a no-brainer value trap or genuine bargain — but bear case wins unless you see a catalyst.
Verdict on current valuation: Based on the DCF (the only anchor given), AKAM is fairly valued at $145. But the business is deteriorating, not improving. No margin of safety exists at that price.
Verdict: PASS
The moat is narrowing, not expanding — switching costs delay death but don’t prevent it, and the numbers (margin collapse, flat net income, falling ROE) prove profitability is structurally impaired. At $145/share, you’re paying for a future that requires margins to stop declining and growth to accelerate — a bet that flies in the face of every trend in the 10‑K. Wait until the market prices in the commodity reality, or until Akamai shows it can earn a 15%+ ROE again; until then, the inversion machine says stay away.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.