AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC.

AMG· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
-0.6%
FY2016–2025
Net Income
3.5%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
-1.9%
FY2015–2025
EPS (Diluted)
9.5%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
22.1%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
7.8%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
34.5%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.83x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$7.5B
Per Share (approx.)
$281.61
25% Margin of Safety
$211.21
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$140.81
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
-0.6%
Latest FCF
$665.3M

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$2.2B$472.8M$1.0B13.1%21.5%$868.6M$430.8M
2017$2.3B$689.5M$1.2B18.0%29.9%$809.0M$439.5M
2018$2.4B$243.6M$1.1B7.0%10.2%$1.8B$565.5M
2019$2.2B$15.7M$919.5M0.5%0.7%$1.8B$539.6M
2020$2.0B$202.2M$1.0B7.3%10.0%$2.3B$1.0B
2021$2.4B$565.7M$1.3B20.3%23.4%$2.5B$908.5M
2022$2.3B$1.1B$1.0B35.5%49.2%$2.5B$429.2M
2023$2.1B$672.9M$861.9M18.8%32.7%$2.5B$813.6M
2024$2.0B$511.6M$928.7M15.3%25.1%$2.6B$950.0M
2025$2.1B$716.6M$967.1M22.1%34.5%$2.7B$586.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. (AMG) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

The beauty here isn't the ticker; it's the structure. It’s an asset-light engine that turns other people's brilliance into our cash flow.

  • The "Partner-Owned" Edge: AMG doesn't manage the money; they hold the keys to the boutiques that do. By leaving the investment professionals with significant equity in their own firms, they ensure the talent stays and fights for the returns. It is an alignment of incentives that keeps the ship afloat.
  • Capital Allocation as a Product: This is a company that effectively acts as a holding company for human capital. When they execute correctly, they are buying high-margin earnings streams without the overhead of building a brand from scratch.
  • The Buyback Trapdoor: When the market loses its mind and undervalues these assets, AMG has a history of retiring shares aggressively. If they can buy back their own stock at a discount, they are compounding value by subtraction, which is often more profitable than growth.
  • Attractive Entry: At a 50% discount to intrinsic value, you aren't buying the boutiques; you’re buying the cash flow at a fire-sale price, effectively getting the growth optionality for free.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

Show me the incentive, and I’ll show you the outcome. The outcome here is a long, slow walk toward obsolescence.

  • The Secular Structural Rot: The rise of passive index funds isn't a "headwind"; it is a permanent shift in the tectonic plates of finance. AMG is essentially a toll collector on a road that is slowly being replaced by a high-speed rail that bypasses them entirely (ETFs).
  • The Winner’s Curse (Adverse Selection): To grow, AMG must buy new boutiques. But who sells their boutique at a fair price? Usually, it's a manager whose best days are behind them or who sees the writing on the wall. They are likely paying top dollar for "yesterday’s heroes" who are incapable of repeating their success.
  • The Complexity Tax: They claim to be a simple holding company, but look at the disconnect between Net Income and FCF. They are gorging on debt to buy shrinking revenue streams. If the leverage doesn't kill them, the fee compression will. They are fighting the tide with borrowed money.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

We are looking for a business that can survive a century, not one that needs a bull market to justify its debt.

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $281.61
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $211.21 (A sensible price for a good business, but this isn't a "good" business in the traditional sense).
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $140.81 (The only price where the risks of active management decay are adequately priced in).
  • Current Assessment: The business is Expensive. Buying a collector of active managers while the industry faces secular decline requires a margin of safety that the current market price does not offer.

Verdict: PASS

We are passing because we cannot find a durable competitive advantage in a financial aggregator model that is structurally disadvantaged by the shift toward passive investing. While the cash flow looks tempting on paper, the underlying businesses are melting ice cubes that require constant capital reinvestment to mask revenue decay. We prefer to own the toll bridge, not the people desperately trying to keep the road open.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.