Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$136.0B
$2.4B
$10.5B
$3.8B
12.3%
1.7%
$8.8B
$19.3B
2017
$177.9B
$3.0B
—
—
10.9%
1.7%
$24.9B
$20.5B
2018
$232.9B
$10.1B
—
—
23.1%
4.3%
$25.0B
$31.8B
2019
$280.5B
$11.6B
—
—
18.7%
4.1%
$24.8B
$36.1B
2020
$386.1B
$21.3B
—
—
22.8%
5.5%
$33.2B
$42.1B
2021
$469.8B
$33.4B
—
—
24.1%
7.1%
$50.6B
$36.2B
2022
$514.0B
-$2.7B
—
—
-1.9%
-0.5%
$70.5B
$53.9B
2023
$574.8B
$30.4B
—
—
15.1%
5.3%
$67.2B
$73.4B
2024
$638.0B
$59.2B
—
—
20.7%
9.3%
$58.0B
$78.8B
2025
$716.9B
$77.7B
—
—
18.9%
10.8%
$68.8B
$86.8B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
AMAZON COM INC (AMZN) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Bridge: Amazon doesn't just sell goods; it owns the infrastructure of modern life. AWS is a digital landlord collecting rent from the entire internet, while the logistics network is a physical landlord collecting a toll on every package moved in North America.
Operating Leverage at Scale: The leap from 1.7% to 10.8% margins proves the model. Once the massive fixed costs of the warehouses and data centers are sunk, every additional dollar of revenue drops significantly more to the bottom line. The machine is finally starting to print.
The Flywheel is Self-Sustaining: Low prices → more customers → more sellers → more data/scale → lower costs. It is a virtuous cycle that makes competition an exercise in futility for anyone lacking a $100B+ balance sheet.
Attractive Entry: Berkshire doesn't buy "growth" for growth's sake, but we buy dominant monopolies when the market forgets how to value their long-term cash generation. It becomes attractive when the price reflects a utility rather than a tech darling.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Capex Treadmill: This is the "Black Hole." If the AI arms race requires an infinite loop of spending on servers just to maintain current market share, the "digital hotel" becomes a money pit. If you have to spend $50B a year just to keep the guests from leaving, you don't own a moat; you own a treadmill.
The Regulatory Guillotine: The US government eventually decides the "Retail + Logistics + Cloud" vertical integration is an illegal monopoly. A forced spin-off of AWS would destroy the cross-subsidization that allows the retail side to bleed competitors dry.
Commoditization of Compute: The risk that AWS becomes a utility like electricity—essential, but with zero pricing power. If Azure and GCP trigger a race to the bottom on pricing, the high-margin engine that fuels the whole company stalls.
Most Likely Threat: The Capex Treadmill. The timeframe is immediate. The obsession with "SeriesOfIndividuallyImmaterialBusinessAcquisitions" and massive server spend suggests management is terrified of falling behind in AI, regardless of the cost to FCF.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The provided DCF is disciplined, perhaps overly so, but it serves as our anchor.
Intrinsic value estimate: $152.72 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $114.54(Conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $76.36(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Expensive. At current market prices (approx. $180+), the market is pricing in significantly more than 8% FCF growth or a lower discount rate. We are paying for perfection in a world of regulatory instability.
Verdict: PASS
The business is wonderful, but the price is not. We do not pay a premium for a "digital hotel" when the management is hiding the cash flow bridge and spending aggressively to stay relevant. We wait for a panic to bring the price toward $115.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.