Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✗Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$24.2B
$5.4B
—
—
26.2%
22.2%
$47.0B
—
2017
$24.8B
$2.7B
$12.5B
—
15.0%
11.1%
$55.8B
—
2018
$26.6B
$6.9B
$7.6B
—
31.0%
26.0%
$58.4B
—
2019
$28.2B
$6.8B
$12.0B
—
29.3%
24.0%
$57.8B
—
2020
$22.0B
$3.1B
$4.1B
—
13.6%
14.3%
$43.0B
—
2021
$27.7B
$8.1B
$13.1B
—
36.3%
29.1%
$38.7B
—
2022
$34.2B
$7.5B
$19.2B
—
30.4%
22.0%
$42.6B
—
2023
$37.2B
$8.4B
$17.0B
—
29.8%
22.5%
$47.9B
—
2024
$38.8B
$10.1B
$12.1B
—
33.5%
26.1%
$49.7B
—
2025
$41.3B
$10.8B
$16.0B
—
32.4%
26.2%
$56.4B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO (AXP) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Moat is a Fortress: This isn't a bank; it's a curated club. By owning both the issuance and the network (the closed-loop), they bypass the middlemen. They don't just collect interest; they collect a "status tax" from merchants eager to attract high-spending customers.
Exceptional Economics:
FCF of $16.0B comfortably exceeding Net Income shows the earnings are real, tangible cash, not accounting fiction.
A 32.4% ROE driven by a customer base that is historically more resilient to economic shocks than the average consumer.
The Buyback Engine: Management is playing a brilliant game. While net income growth is a modest 7.7%, they are aggressively retiring shares to deliver a 26.4% EPS CAGR. They are essentially buying back a high-quality business at reasonable prices to amplify shareholder returns.
Attractive Entry: Berkshire loves a "toll bridge" with pricing power. This becomes a "no-brainer" when the price reflects a conservative growth rate, allowing the buybacks to provide the actual alpha.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
The Regulatory Guillotine: The greatest threat isn't a competitor; it's the government. If regulators successfully cap "Merchant Discount Fees" (similar to the Durbin Amendment), the toll bridge is demolished. A forced reduction in fees permanently impairs the high-margin revenue stream.
The Brand Decay (The "Dad Card" Risk): The moat is built on prestige. If the next generation of high-earners views Amex as obsolete or an artifact of their parents' generation, the network effect reverses. Once the "cool factor" vanishes, the merchants will stop paying the premium to accept the card.
The "Black Swan" Credit Event: While they serve the wealthy, extreme wealth isn't immune to systemic collapse. A permanent shift in the global economy that wipes out the "upper-middle-class" spender would leave Amex with an expensive infrastructure and no one to pay the tolls.
Most Likely Threat: Regulatory intervention on fees. Timeframe: 3–7 years.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $347.29 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $260.47(conservative).
50% margin of safety entry: $173.65(Buffett's ideal).
Current Status: Fairly valued to slightly undervalued (depending on current market spot). The DCF suggests a healthy ceiling, but the lack of a "deep discount" means we are paying for the quality of the moat.
Verdict: WATCH
The business is a gold mine, but the price doesn't yet offer the fat pitch Berkshire demands. We have high conviction in the moat, but we wait for a market spasm to bring the price toward $260. We don't buy "great" businesses at "fair" prices; we buy them at wonderful prices.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.