10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$83.7B
$17.8B
—
—
6.7%
21.3%
$216.8B
$147.7B
2017
$87.1B
$18.2B
—
—
6.8%
20.9%
$227.4B
$157.4B
2018
$91.0B
$28.1B
—
—
10.6%
30.9%
$229.4B
$177.4B
2019
$91.2B
$27.4B
—
—
10.4%
30.1%
$240.9B
$161.6B
2020
$85.5B
$17.9B
—
—
6.6%
20.9%
$262.9B
—
2021
$89.1B
$32.0B
—
—
11.8%
35.9%
$280.1B
—
2022
$95.0B
$27.5B
—
—
10.1%
29.0%
$276.0B
—
2023
$102.8B
$26.3B
—
—
9.1%
25.6%
$302.2B
—
2024
$105.9B
$27.0B
—
—
9.2%
25.5%
$283.3B
—
2025
$113.1B
$30.5B
—
—
10.1%
27.0%
$317.8B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ (BAC) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren’s voice)
Moat is government-guaranteed. Too-big-to-fail means BAC borrows cheaper than any competitor. Depositors won’t move 67 million accounts for a few bps. Switching costs are real – changing banks is a pain in the neck reserved for life events.
Scale generates steady fees. Card interchange, asset management, investment banking – $113B in revenue is hard to replicate. The machine prints money even when loan growth stalls.
Buybacks have been aggressive. Share count down 34% in a decade. If you buy at distressed prices, that’s a powerful tailwind. At book value or below, BAC becomes a leveraged bet on the economy with a government backstop.
Attractive entry price? If the market overreacts to credit cycle fears and BAC trades at 0.8× book (~$28–30), the 10% ROE yields a 12.5% earnings yield. That’s a decent margin of safety for a utility-like bank with a quasi-sovereign floor.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Munger’s rule: “Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
Structural threat #1: Digital disintermediation of deposits. A trusted platform (Apple, PayPal, stablecoin wallet) that replaces checking accounts. If cheap deposits flee, BAC’s funding advantage evaporates. Net interest margin collapses. This is a 10‑year clock, not a recession.
Structural threat #2: Regulatory cap on fee income. Interchange, overdraft, and service charges are under political siege. Margin already compressed 25% (35.9% → 27.0%) in four years. If regulators squeeze further, noninterest income shrinks permanently.
Structural threat #3: Leverage trap. Debt grew 47% faster than revenue. $317.8B of debt + $113B revenue = 2.8× debt/revenue. A 200‑bp rate spike adds $3B+ interest cost (10% of net income). One credit cycle hiccup and earnings vanish. The bank is a spinning top – it works until confidence breaks.
Most likely killer: Technology + regulation together. Deposits leak to fintechs, fee income gets capped, and BAC is left with a shrinking spread and a bloated cost base. No moat widening – just slow emasculation.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Given no FCF for DCF, we use earnings power:
Net income: $30.5B (2025)
Share count (est.): ~7.5B after buybacks
EPS: ~$4.07
Normalized P/E for a mediocre bank: 10–12× → intrinsic value $41–49 per share
Book value (implied): ~$31 (ROE 10%, BV ~$30B? Actually $30.5B NI / 10% ROE = $305B equity, /7.5B shares = $40.7 BV) — so current BV ~$40–41
Intrinsic value estimate:$45 (midpoint of P/E range, roughly 1.1× book)
25% margin of safety entry:$34 (0.85× book)
50% margin of safety entry:$22 (0.55× book – Buffett’s ideal panic price)
Current check: If BAC trades near $42 today, it’s fairly valued – no margin of safety. If it dips below $34, the bull case starts to work.
Verdict: WATCH
At current levels the stock is fair for a fading moat with opaque cash flows; wait for a clear 25% discount to intrinsic value ($34 or below) or a structural catalyst that resets the business model. The government backstop keeps it from zero, but the compounding engine is sputtering – not worth reaching for.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.