Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$121.5B
$1.4B
$2.5B
$1.6B
21.8%
1.2%
—
$2.4B
2017
$130.0B
$1.3B
$797.0M
$1.6B
18.9%
1.0%
—
$6.9B
2018
$136.8B
$256.0M
$2.4B
$904.0M
4.2%
0.2%
—
$1.8B
2019
$145.5B
$1.4B
$2.4B
$2.0B
21.5%
0.9%
—
$2.5B
2020
$152.9B
-$3.7B
$1.6B
-$3.2B
-206.6%
-2.4%
—
$2.8B
2021
$162.5B
$611.0M
$2.0B
$994.0M
34.1%
0.4%
—
$3.4B
2022
$181.3B
-$938.0M
$2.8B
-$633.0M
—
-0.5%
—
$4.7B
2023
$205.0B
$330.0M
$2.4B
$541.0M
—
0.2%
—
$4.1B
2024
$226.8B
$852.0M
$3.3B
$1.1B
—
0.4%
—
$5.1B
2025
$222.6B
$1.6B
$1.9B
$1.8B
—
0.7%
—
$3.9B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
CARDINAL HEALTH INC (CAH) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Essential Toll Bridge: This isn't a "growth" story; it's a "plumbing" story. CAH is the critical infrastructure of US healthcare. The moat is physicality—thousands of warehouses and trucks that no startup can replicate overnight.
High Switching Costs: For a hospital or pharmacy, switching distributors is a cardiovascular event for their supply chain. The risk of "running out of meds" far outweighs the benefit of saving a few basis points on a fee.
Specialty Pivot: The move into "Specialty" is an attempt to move from commodity shipping to value-added logistics. If they can scale high-margin biologics and specialty drugs, they transform from a warehouse into a partner.
Attractive Entry: This becomes a Berkshire play only if it is priced as a boring utility. We don't buy this for the upside; we buy it because the downside is floored by the sheer necessity of the product.
Price Range: Genuinely attractive below $75.00. At that level, we are paying for the assets and the steady cash flow, not the hope of growth.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
The Revenue Mirage: The business is suffering from "Growth Cancer." Revenue grows (8.1% CAGR) while Free Cash Flow shrinks (-1.9% CAGR). This is the classic hallmark of a business that is scaling its inefficiencies.
The Disintermediation Death Spiral: What happens when the "middleman" is no longer needed? Whether it's Amazon Pharmacy or manufacturers selling direct to huge GPOs (Group Purchasing Organizations), CAH is one structural shift away from becoming an expensive relic.
The Commodity Trap: They are chasing "Specialty" margins because the core business is a race to the bottom. When your moat is "grinding difficulty," you are vulnerable to anyone who finds a more efficient way to grind.
Most Likely Failure: The FCF Treadmill. Over the next 5–10 years, the most likely scenario is that the cost of maintaining this massive infrastructure rises faster than the razor-thin fees they can charge, leading to a permanent stagnation of the share price and a slow decay of the dividend.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF provided is sobering. It assumes very low growth, which is appropriate for a treadmill business.
Intrinsic value estimate: $97.25 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $72.94(Conservative—protects against FCF decay).
50% margin of safety entry: $48.63(Buffett's ideal—essentially buying the infrastructure for free).
Current Status: Fairly valued to slightly expensive. If the market is pricing this near $100, there is zero margin of safety for a business with declining FCF.
Verdict: PASS
The business is running faster just to stay in the same place. While the moat is wide, the economics are leaking. We do not buy treadmill businesses at fair value; we only buy them at fire-sale prices.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.