Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$17.4B
$573.1M
$425.8M
$748.8M
19.0%
3.3%
$2.6B
$762.6M
2017
$18.6B
$697.1M
$716.4M
$925.2M
16.9%
3.7%
$2.0B
$751.8M
2018
$21.3B
$1.1B
$903.4M
$1.3B
21.5%
5.0%
$1.8B
$777.2M
2019
$23.9B
$1.3B
$929.9M
$1.4B
20.6%
5.4%
$1.8B
$971.8M
2020
$23.8B
$752.0M
$1.6B
$987.1M
10.6%
3.2%
$1.4B
$1.9B
2021
$27.7B
$1.8B
$2.2B
$2.2B
21.5%
6.6%
$1.5B
$2.4B
2022
$30.8B
$1.4B
$1.4B
$1.8B
17.9%
4.6%
$1.1B
$1.3B
2023
$31.9B
$986.0M
—
—
11.9%
3.1%
$2.8B
$1.3B
2024
$35.8B
$968.0M
—
—
11.5%
2.7%
$3.2B
$1.1B
2025
$40.5B
$1.2B
—
—
13.0%
2.9%
$5.0B
$1.9B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
CBRE GROUP, INC. (CBRE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Toll Bridge Model: CBRE isn't betting on property values; they are betting on activity. Whether a building is being sold, leased, or merely kept from falling apart, CBRE takes a slice. It is a fee-based business that avoids the heavy capital expenditures of owning the dirt.
Institutional Stickiness: The Global Workplace Solutions (GWS) segment is the crown jewel. For a Fortune 500 company, switching the facility management of 50 global offices is a logistical nightmare that outweighs the cost of mediocre service. This creates a predictable, recurring revenue stream that behaves more like a utility than a brokerage.
The Data Monopoly: Their scale gives them an information advantage that no boutique firm can match. They see the trades before the market does. In a fragmented industry, the biggest player usually captures the most prestigious (and highest-margin) mandates.
Attractive Entry: This becomes a Berkshire-style "fat pitch" only if the market confuses a cyclical downturn in commercial real estate with a permanent destruction of the business model. We want it when the "empire building" is priced as a failure, but the "toll bridge" remains intact.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Margin Death Spiral: Revenue is ballooning while net margins are cratering (6.6% → 2.9%). This is the classic sign of a business that has lost its pricing power. They are buying revenue to please the street, but they are paying for that growth through lower margins and higher debt.
The "Empire" Trap: Management is addicted to M&A. When you buy growth via acquisition (JJ Worldwide, Pearce, etc.) rather than organic compounding, you aren't building a moat—you're hiding a leak. The escalation of debt to fund these purchases is reckless in a high-rate environment.
Structural Obsolescence: The "Office" is not just in a slump; it is being redefined. If the total volume of commercial square footage required by the global economy drops permanently, no amount of "middleman skimming" can save the bottom line.
Most Likely Failure: Margin collapse driven by debt service. Over the next 3–5 years, if interest costs rise while net margins stay below 3%, the "service bureau" becomes a liability. They will be forced to sell assets or dilute shareholders to keep the lights on.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $79.90 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $59.93(conservative).
50% margin of safety entry: $39.95(Buffett's ideal).
Status: Expensive. The market is pricing this as a growth engine, but the numbers reveal a low-margin service firm. It is trading well above its intrinsic value based on the provided DCF.
Verdict: PASS
The price is disconnected from the deteriorating margins. The "moat" is merely a switching cost that masks a lack of organic growth. We do not buy businesses that require a shopping spree of acquisitions to keep the revenue line moving upward.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.