COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP /NEW

COST· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
9.0%
FY2015–2025
Net Income
13.0%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
15.8%
FY2018–2025
EPS (Diluted)
13.0%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
27.8%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
10.5%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
2.9%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.20x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$280.8B
Per Share (approx.)
$633.42
25% Margin of Safety
$475.07
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$316.71
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
15.0%
Latest FCF
$7.8B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$118.7B$2.4B$956.0M19.5%2.0%$5.2B$3.4B
2017$129.0B$515.0M-$617.0M4.8%0.4%$6.7B$4.5B
2018$141.6B$3.1B$2.8B$1.6B24.5%2.2%$6.6B$6.1B
2019$152.7B$3.7B$3.4B$2.2B24.0%2.4%$6.9B$8.4B
2020$166.8B$4.0B$6.1B$2.8B21.9%2.4%$7.7B$12.3B
2021$195.9B$5.0B$5.4B$3.2B28.5%2.6%$7.5B$11.3B
2022$227.0B$5.8B$3.5B$3.9B28.3%2.6%$6.5B$10.2B
2023$242.3B$6.3B$6.7B$4.0B25.1%2.6%$5.4B$13.7B
2024$254.5B$7.4B$6.6B$4.9B31.2%2.9%$5.8B$9.9B
2025$275.2B$8.1B$7.8B$5.0B27.8%2.9%$5.7B$14.2B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP /NEW (COST) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Toll Bridge Model: Costco doesn't sell products; it sells a subscription to low prices. The membership fee is a high-margin annuity that decouples profit from the volatility of retail margins.
  • Virtuous Cycle of Scale:
    • Low SKUs → Massive volume per item → Extreme leverage over suppliers → Lower prices → More members → More volume.
    • This isn't just a moat; it's a fortress. The more they grow, the harder it is for anyone to catch them.
  • Customer Alignment: Unlike most retailers, Costco's incentive is to lower prices to drive membership growth. They are the only company in the world that wins by giving their profit back to the customer.
  • Management Discipline: No "diworsification." They don't buy flashy brands or enter markets they don't understand. They build warehouses and keep the culture intact.
  • Attractive Entry: This business is world-class, but we don't pay any price. It becomes genuinely attractive when the market stops pricing it as a "tech company" and remembers it's a warehouse operator.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

  • Scenario 1: The Logistics Leapfrog. A competitor (Amazon or a sovereign-wealth-backed entity) achieves a cost structure so efficient that "bulk buying" becomes an inconvenience rather than a saving. If the friction of visiting a warehouse outweighs the savings of the membership, the psychological trap snaps.
  • Scenario 2: The Membership Ceiling. There is a finite number of households that can or will pay $65+ for access to soap and rotisserie chickens. If membership growth plateaus and the "sunk cost" psychology fades, the primary profit engine stalls.
  • Scenario 3: The Valuation Delusion. The greatest risk isn't the business; it's the price. Paying a "perfection premium" leaves no room for error. A slight dip in ROE or a membership price hike that triggers a backlash could lead to a massive multiple compression.
  • Most Likely Threat: Valuation risk. The business is nearly bulletproof, but the stock price is often priced for a future that ignores the laws of gravity.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

Reacting to the DCF estimate of $633.42

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $633.42 per share.
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $475.07 (conservative).
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $316.71 (Buffett's ideal).
  • Current Status: Grossly expensive. At current market prices (well above $800), the market is pricing in growth far beyond the estimated 15% FCF CAGR. We are paying for the "prestige" of the moat, not the cash it produces.

Verdict: PASS

The business is a masterpiece, but the price is a fantasy. We do not buy great companies at mediocre prices. We wait for the market to stop hallucinating.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.