DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP

DECK· FY2026 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
History1 mo agoWATCH|4 mo agoWATCH|4 mo agoWATCH
WATCH

📜 Signal History & Model Audit Trail (3 Runs)

🟢 LATEST (2026-07-29)WATCHat $103.92
IV: $228.581 mo ago
● 2026-05-04WATCHat $100.88
IV: $228.584 mo ago
● 2026-04-18WATCHat $112.50
IV: $228.584 mo ago
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
13.7%
FY2017–2025
Net Income
19.8%
FY2010–2025
Free Cash Flow
36.1%
FY2016–2025
EPS (Diluted)
23.3%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
38.4%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
27.1%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
19.4%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$34.3B
Per Share (approx.)
$228.58
25% Margin of Safety
$171.43
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$114.29
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
15.0%
Latest FCF
$958.4M

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$122.3M$59.6M$105.8M12.6%$246.0M
2017$1.8B$5.7M$154.8M0.6%0.3%$291.8M
2018$1.9B$114.4M$292.5M12.2%6.0%$430.0M
2019$2.0B$264.3M$330.4M25.3%13.1%$589.7M
2020$2.1B$276.1M$253.9M24.2%12.9%$649.4M
2021$2.5B$382.6M$564.0M26.5%15.0%$1.1B
2022$3.2B$451.9M$121.3M$441.2M29.4%14.3%$843.5M
2023$3.6B$516.8M$456.4M$480.9M29.3%14.2%$981.8M
2024$4.3B$759.6M$943.8M$725.2M36.0%17.7%$1.5B
2025$5.0B$966.1M$958.4M$947.5M38.4%19.4%$1.9B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP (DECK) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • Two compounding machines, not one. Hoka (technical running) and UGG (premium comfort) both hold pricing power. Hoka’s growth is still early – wholesale channel expanding, DTC margins rising. UGG is a cash cow that funds Hoka’s R&D. Together they’ve driven ROE from 12.6% to 38.4% in a decade – that’s not luck, that’s brand economics.
  • Exceptional unit economics. Gross margin 59.5%, net margin 19.4% – both expanding. SG&A as % of sales flat while revenue doubled. Every incremental dollar drops more to the bottom line. This is the definition of operating leverage without capital intensity.
  • Zero debt, infinite interest coverage. The balance sheet is a fortress. If a recession hits, Deckers can slash prices, buy back shares, or ride out inventory gluts. No creditors tapping on the window.
  • Management’s capital allocation is textbook. No dilutive acquisitions, share count down ~3% annually, reinvestment only in high-return projects. They treat equity like it’s their own.
  • At what price does it become attractive? At a 25% margin of safety – i.e., an entry price below $171 per share – the business is a bargain. At that level, even if Hoka growth slows to 10% and tariffs shave 2% off margins, you still earn a 10%+ annualized return over a decade. Below $114 (50% margin of safety), it’s a no-brainer.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

Munger’s rule: “Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”

  • Scenario #1: Tariff escalation + concentration risk (Most Likely, 1–3 years).
    Single-source manufacturing in China/Vietnam – no factory ownership, zero vertical integration. If the US slaps 50%+ tariffs on footwear imports and Deckers can’t fully pass through (retailers refuse, Hoka/UGG lose price leadership), gross margin drops from 59.5% to 50% overnight. Net margin halves. That’s a $1B+ market cap loss. This is structural – not a cyclical dip – because supply chains take years to move.
  • Scenario #2: Competitor replication of Hoka’s tech (3–5 years).
    Nike, On, or Brooks pour $500M+ into R&D and marketing to match Hoka’s cushioning and fit. Hoka’s moat isn’t IP – it’s first‑mover brand heat. If a deep‑pocketed rival launches a “better Hoka” with aggressive pricing, Hoka’s growth stalls and its premium pricing erodes. That’s a permanent impairment to the $3B+ Hoka brand value.
  • Scenario #3: Fashion fade of UGG (5–10 years).
    UGG is a fashion‑driven brand – not technical. It has cycled in and out of popularity before. A prolonged shift in consumer taste (e.g., towards sustainable materials or lower‑priced alternatives) could cut UGG revenue by 30–50% and blow a hole in Deckers’ margins (UGG carries high fixed costs in marketing and retail). This is the slow death – likely avoidable if management transitions UGG into a lifestyle brand, but not guaranteed.

Which is most likely? Tariff escalation within the next 2 years. It’s already flagged in the 10-K as a risk, and political tailwinds for protectionism are rising. This is the kill shot – and it’s structural because you can’t unwind supply chains overnight.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

  • DCF intrinsic value estimate: $34.3B total / $228.58 per share (15% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal).
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $171.44 (conservative – accounts for tariff risk and 1–2 years of slower growth).
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $114.29 (Buffett’s ideal – a true bargain that compensates for any permanent impairment).
  • Current price: Not provided, but based on recent market levels (~$200), the stock trades at a 12% discount to intrinsic value – close to fair, not a steal. No large margin of safety.
  • Is it cheap, fair, or expensive? Fair to slightly undervalued. The market is pricing in strong Hoka growth but ignoring the tariff overhang. If tariffs don’t materialize, $228 is achievable within 12 months. If they do, the stock could fall to $140–160.

Verdict: WATCH

The business is exceptional – pristine economics, brilliant capital allocation, and a widening moat – but the single-source manufacturing risk and lack of a meaningful margin of safety at current levels make a large purchase premature. We will wait for a pullback to $170 or below, where the tariff risk is adequately discounted and the compounding story still holds. Patience, not perfection.

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.