Walt Disney Co

DIS· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 6 days ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
7.0%
FY2017–2025
Net Income
4.7%
FY2017–2025
Free Cash Flow
43.5%
FY2023–2025
EPS (Diluted)
2.7%
FY2017–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
11.3%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
6.3%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
13.1%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.38x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$361.0B
Per Share (approx.)
$202.21
25% Margin of Safety
$151.66
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$101.10
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
15.0%
Latest FCF
$10.1B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2017$55.1B$9.0B$8.1B16.3%$4.0B
2018$59.4B$12.6B$11.1B25.8%21.2%$20.9B$4.2B
2019$69.6B$11.1B$10.3B12.4%15.9%$47.0B$5.4B
2020$65.4B-$2.9B-$1.5B-3.4%-4.4%$58.6B$17.9B
2021$67.4B$2.0B$3.5B2.3%3.0%$54.4B$16.0B
2022$82.7B$3.1B$3.4B3.3%3.8%$48.4B$11.6B
2023$88.9B$2.4B$4.9B$2.8B2.4%2.6%$46.4B$14.2B
2024$91.4B$5.0B$8.6B$4.5B4.9%5.4%$45.8B$6.0B
2025$94.4B$12.4B$10.1B$9.7B11.3%13.1%$42.0B$5.7B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

Walt Disney Co (DIS) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Tollbooth on Childhood: Disney owns the ultimate psychological moat—manufactured nostalgia. A parent will happily pay a premium for a Disney cruise or a trip to Disneyland because they are buying a lifetime memory, not a commodity vacation. You cannot build a competitor to Mickey Mouse; he has lived in the human mind for a century.
  • The Capital-Light IP Engine: When Disney creates an asset like Frozen, it doesn’t just sell a movie ticket. It licenses toys, sells video games, builds Broadway plays, and erects permanent physical attractions in parks worldwide. The original capital expenditure on the art is depreciated, but the cash-generative power of the character compounds indefinitely.
  • Unrivaled Live Sports Monopoly: ESPN remains the undisputed king of live American sports. In a fragmented media landscape, live sports are the only content that audiences must watch in real-time, giving Disney immense, enduring leverage over advertisers and distributors.
  • The Value Play: If you isolate the "Experiences" business (Parks and Resorts) from the media mess, you are looking at one of the finest businesses in the world. If we can buy the consolidated company at a price that essentially values the media division at zero, we are getting a world-class tourism monopoly with an incredible margin of safety.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

"Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."

  • The Streaming Treadmill: Disney traded a glorious, high-margin, predictable cash cow—the cable bundle—for a hyper-competitive, low-margin, high-churn streaming model. In streaming, you are on a permanent content-spending treadmill; the moment you stop pouring billions into new shows, subscribers click "cancel" with a single thumb-tap.
  • The Legacy Empire Writedown: The $71.3B acquisition of Fox in 2019 was a classic act of corporate empire-building that loaded the balance sheet with $58.6B in peak debt. Management proved they would rather be bigger than more profitable, severely diluting shareholders to 1,785,288,846 outstanding shares while driving ROE down from 25.8% in 2018 to 11.3% in 2025.
  • The Death Scenario (The Linear Cliff): If the linear television ecosystem collapses faster than Disney can scale profitable streaming, the massive cash flow that historically subsidized park expansions and dividend payments will dry up. If ESPN is forced to pay skyrocketing sports rights fees without the guaranteed support of non-sports-watching cable subscribers, the business model structurally breaks. This is not a temporary cyclical downturn; it is a permanent, terminal decline of their most profitable distribution channel.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

The provided DCF models a highly optimistic future, assuming Disney can grow its FCF by 15.0% annually over the forecast period to reach an intrinsic value of $202.21 per share. We find a 15.0% growth rate highly suspect given the structural headwinds in legacy media.

  • Intrinsic Value Estimate: $202.21 per share.
  • 25% Margin of Safety Entry: $151.66 per share (for a normal, high-quality business).
  • 50% Margin of Safety Entry: $101.11 per share (Buffett's ideal price to offset the structural risks).
  • The Assessment: At current market prices, the stock appears superficially cheap compared to its historical peaks. However, we are not buying the past; we are buying the future. Because Disney is being out-earned on capital by a cable utility like Comcast (11.3% ROE vs. CMCSA's 20.6%), the current price does not offer an adequate margin of safety to offset the $42.0B debt load and the ongoing media transition.

Verdict: [PASS]

While Disney’s theme parks and core character library represent a world-class moat, we cannot invest in a business where management is forced to burn billions on a low-return streaming treadmill to replace a dying cable model. We will not reward past capital destruction with our partners' money, especially when the return on equity has been cut in half since 2018. Until management prioritizes owner earnings over media market share, or the stock price drops below our ultra-conservative $101.11 threshold, Berkshire will keep its checkbook closed.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.