Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$84.9B
$2.5B
$2.7B
$2.0B
9.8%
2.9%
$15.3B
$4.1B
2017
$90.0B
$3.8B
$3.4B
$3.2B
14.5%
4.3%
$18.7B
$3.6B
2018
$92.1B
$3.8B
$2.6B
$2.7B
13.1%
4.1%
$18.1B
$3.9B
2019
$104.2B
$4.8B
$5.0B
$3.9B
15.2%
4.6%
$19.4B
$4.9B
2020
$121.9B
$4.6B
$9.7B
$3.7B
13.8%
3.8%
$20.0B
$5.7B
2021
$138.6B
$6.2B
$7.3B
$5.2B
17.1%
4.4%
$22.8B
$4.9B
2022
$156.6B
$5.9B
$7.2B
$4.9B
16.3%
3.8%
$23.8B
$7.4B
2023
$171.3B
$6.0B
$6.8B
$4.8B
15.2%
3.5%
$24.9B
$6.5B
2024
$177.0B
$6.0B
$4.6B
$4.8B
14.5%
3.4%
$30.9B
$8.3B
2025
$199.1B
$5.7B
$3.2B
$4.6B
12.9%
2.8%
$31.9B
$9.5B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Elevance Health, Inc. (ELV) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The beauty of the insurance business is the float and the certainty of the demand.
The Mandatory Toll Booth: Health is not discretionary. Regardless of the economic cycle, people require insurance and pharmacy services. Elevance sits in the middle of this mandatory flow, acting as a massive, government-sanctioned utility.
The Carelon Integration: By owning both the insurer and the service provider (Carelon), Elevance is attempting to control the entire medical cost bucket. If they can successfully divert care to their own lower-cost facilities, they capture the margin that usually goes to third-party providers.
The "Blue" Brand: The Blue Cross Blue Shield name isn't just a trademark; it is an institution. In many states, this provides a "first-call" advantage that is nearly impossible for a disruptor to replicate without spending billions on customer acquisition.
The Compounding Play: If the company stops wasting capital on "individually immaterial" acquisitions and stabilizes their FCF conversion, the intrinsic value is backed by a massive, predictable premium base.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Munger's rule: "Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."
The Regulatory Guillotine: Elevance does not "own" its moat; the government lends it to them. If legislators decide that managed care is extracting too much rent from the system, they can tighten the screws on Medical Loss Ratios (MLR) or cap pharmacy spreads. The risk of permanent impairment here is 100% policy-driven.
The Accounting Mirage: When Net Income is $5.7B but FCF is only $3.2B, the company is not "earning" the profits reported on the income statement; they are capitalizing them. They are spending vast amounts of cash to maintain a status quo that isn't growing. You cannot eat earnings; you can only eat cash.
The "Diworsification" Trap: Management is addicted to growth for the sake of size, evidenced by the $199.1B revenue figure alongside stagnant earnings. They are buying small, fragmented businesses to hide the fact that the core insurance business is commoditized. That isn't strategy; that’s an expensive attempt to outrun decay.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF calculation provided is based on an 8% FCF growth assumption that contradicts the company's recent reality of cratering cash flow.
Intrinsic value estimate: $536.98 (Assumes current optimism holds; likely overstated given FCF trends).
25% margin of safety entry: $402.74(Still risky given the accounting divergence).
50% margin of safety entry: $268.49(The only price where the regulatory risk is arguably priced in).
Verdict: This is currently expensive. The market is pricing in perpetual growth in a sector facing structural margin compression and declining FCF quality.
Verdict: PASS
We are not interested in paying a premium for a business that requires massive, low-return acquisitions just to keep its cash flow from collapsing. Until the disconnect between Net Income and actual cash generation is resolved, this is a financial treadmill, not a compounder. The regulatory environment ensures this will never be a "wonderful company," and at these prices, it is certainly not a wonderful price.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.