10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$374.7M
$210.4M
—
—
25.8%
56.1%
$24.8M
$189.1M
2017
$399.3M
$197.0M
—
—
23.0%
49.3%
$74.7M
$215.7M
2018
$2.4B
$288.2M
—
—
29.6%
12.1%
$97.9M
$266.4M
2019
$2.5B
$316.8M
—
—
28.0%
12.8%
$95.8M
—
2020
$2.5B
$293.3M
—
—
24.7%
11.6%
$93.8M
—
2021
$2.6B
$297.9M
—
—
22.2%
11.3%
$91.7M
—
2022
$2.8B
$298.6M
—
—
20.6%
10.5%
$0
—
2023
$3.3B
$446.1M
—
—
26.8%
13.6%
—
—
2024
$3.8B
$600.3M
—
—
30.2%
15.8%
—
—
2025
$4.1B
$559.3M
—
—
24.5%
13.8%
—
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
ERIE INDEMNITY CO (ERIE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Moat is real and durable. Erie Indemnity is the exclusive attorney-in-fact for the Erie Insurance Exchange — a mutual insurer with $4.1B in premiums. Switching costs are prohibitive: agents, systems, brand, and a long-term contract. The Exchange would need to rebuild from scratch.
No underwriting risk, ever. Revenue is a fee on written premium plus a fixed management fee. No claims, no loss reserves, no catastrophe exposure. The economics are a toll booth on the Exchange's growth.
Balance sheet pristine. Zero debt. ROE consistently 20–30% since 2016. No dilution (share count assumed stable). This is a cash machine if the fee structure holds.
Attractive at the right price. If the market overreacts to a temporary Exchange loss cycle, Erie’s fee stream becomes a distressed bargain. A P/E below 15 on the recurring $0.6B net income would imply a total value under $9B — a 25% margin of safety against its historical multiple.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Structural impairment #1: Perverse fee incentive + regulatory backlash. Erie’s revenue rises when the Exchange raises premiums to cover underwriting losses. If the Exchange bleeds money while Erie’s fees grow, policyholders and state regulators will demand contract renegotiation. This is a ticking time bomb — not a recession, but a political threat that could permanently cap or cut the fee.
Structural impairment #2: Margin compression is real, not cyclical. Net margin fell from 15.8% (2024) to 13.8% (2025) — costs rising faster than fee revenue. If this trend continues (operating leverage works in reverse), the fee stream becomes commoditized. The moat narrows from “exclusive manager” to “just another administrator.”
Structural impairment #3: Opaque financials = hidden risk. No cash flow statement, no share count, no explanation for a 5× revenue jump in 2018. Earnings may be overstated via reserve manipulation. Without free cash flow, you can't trust the reported $0.6B net income. This is the most likely permanent impairment: discovering that owner earnings are half of reported net income.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
DCF not possible — no free cash flow history. Using reported net income $0.6B (2025) and a conservative P/E of 15 (to account for margin compression and opacity) gives a total intrinsic value of ~$9B.
Share count undisclosed. Applying a typical float (≈52M shares) yields ~$173 per share.
25% margin of safety entry:$130
50% margin of safety entry:$87
Current market price (assumed >$200) offers no margin of safety. Even at $200, P/E is ~17.4 — not cheap enough for the risk of hidden earnings and regulatory tail risk.
Verdict: PASS
Erie Indemnity’s moat is genuine but narrowing, and management’s opacity (no cash flow, no share count, unexplained 2018 discontinuity) disqualifies it as a Berkshire holding. Without a clear accounting of owner earnings, we cannot trust the reported $0.6B net income — it may be inflated. The current price offers no margin of safety, and the perverse fee incentive increases regulatory risk over time.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.