Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
–Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$1.4B
$430.8M
—
—
23.4%
30.4%
—
$974.4M
2017
$1.5B
$489.3M
—
—
24.6%
31.7%
—
$1.1B
2018
$8.1B
$618.2M
—
—
31.1%
7.6%
—
$923.7M
2019
$7.9B
$590.4M
—
—
26.9%
7.4%
—
$1.2B
2020
$9.6B
$696.1M
—
—
26.2%
7.3%
—
$1.5B
2021
$16.5B
$1.4B
—
—
40.5%
8.6%
—
$1.7B
2022
$17.1B
$1.4B
—
—
43.6%
8.0%
—
$2.0B
2023
$9.3B
$752.9M
—
—
31.5%
8.1%
—
$1.5B
2024
$10.6B
$810.1M
—
—
36.4%
7.6%
—
$1.1B
2025
$11.1B
$810.3M
—
—
34.4%
7.3%
—
$1.3B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON INC (EXPD) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Toll Bridge" without the Bridge: This is a pure-play intellectual monopoly. They earn a spread on global trade without the crushing CAPEX of owning ships or planes. They sell expertise and organization, not steel.
High-Velocity Capital: An ROE consistently above 23% (peaking at 43.6%) tells me the business generates cash far faster than it needs to reinvest. It is a capital-light machine that scales via talent, not debt.
The Regulatory Moat: Global customs is a labyrinth of bureaucracy. Once a client is integrated into EXPD's proprietary systems, the "cost of switching" isn't just a fee—it's the risk of their entire supply chain grinding to a halt at a border. That is a formidable psychological and operational anchor.
Management Discipline: They have the rare virtue of saying no. By avoiding the "empire-building" urge to acquire low-quality competitors, they've maintained a clean culture and high organic margins.
Attractive Range: This becomes a "fat pitch" if we can acquire it at a price that assumes zero growth for a decade. I want to pay for the current cash flow and get the future growth for free.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Digital Disintermediation: The "middleman" dies when the platform wins. If a tech giant (Amazon/Flexport) successfully creates a seamless, automated "click-to-ship" global layer, EXPD's human-centric brokerage becomes a legacy cost rather than a value-add.
The Great Deglobalization: The business thrives on the complexity of long-haul, cross-border trade. A structural shift toward near-shoring (e.g., US companies moving factories from China to Mexico) reduces the "administrative headache" EXPD solves, shrinking their moat.
The Commodity Trap: If the industry shifts from "value-added service" to "lowest price per container," the switching costs evaporate. Once the service is commoditized, the only lever left is price, and that is a race to the bottom.
Most Likely Threat: Disintermediation via AI/Automation. Timeframe: 5–10 years. The risk isn't a sudden crash, but a slow "leak" of margins as the "administrative headache" is solved by an algorithm.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Reacting to the DCF of $103.59 per share.
Intrinsic value estimate: $103.59
25% margin of safety entry: $77.69(Conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $51.80(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Expensive. At current market prices (well above $100), the market has already priced in the moat and steady growth. We are paying for the "perfection" of the model, leaving no room for the "Charlie-style" errors.
Verdict: PASS
The business is a wonderful machine, but the price is not wonderful. We do not buy great companies at fair prices; we buy them at discounted prices. Wait for a systemic panic to bring the price toward $80.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.