Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$1.3B
$227.0M
$117.4M
$229.2M
9.4%
17.9%
—
—
2017
$1.3B
$165.5M
—
—
3.9%
12.4%
—
—
2018
$1.9B
$545.0M
—
—
12.1%
28.1%
—
—
2019
$1.8B
$441.0M
—
—
9.2%
24.3%
—
—
2020
—
$845.0M
—
—
10.5%
—
—
—
2021
—
$999.0M
—
—
12.2%
—
—
—
2022
$3.2B
$900.0M
$2.3B
$957.0M
10.9%
28.1%
—
—
2023
$3.5B
$897.0M
$1.3B
$962.0M
10.0%
25.9%
—
—
2024
$3.2B
$775.0M
$1.2B
$832.0M
8.8%
24.3%
—
—
2025
$3.4B
$982.0M
$595.0M
$1.0B
11.1%
28.7%
—
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
FIRST HORIZON CORP (FHN) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
This isn't a "wonderful business," but it is a predictable one—provided the sky doesn't fall.
The "Lazy" Float: The moat is simple. Millions of customers leave their money in checking accounts out of habit. This provides a low-cost source of capital (the float) that FHN deploys into higher-yielding loans.
Regional Dominance: Deep roots in the Southeast provide a localized advantage. They aren't fighting a national war; they are owning their backyard.
The Commodity Play: While it is a "commodity business in a suit," commodities are profitable when bought at a deep discount to intrinsic value. If the market panics and ignores the stability of the deposit base, the yield becomes irresistible.
Attractive Entry: This becomes a Berkshire play only if the price reflects the mediocrity of the ROE. We don't pay a premium for an 11% return; we pay a discount.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The Accounting Mirage: The most glaring red flag is the $0.4B gap between Net Income and Free Cash Flow. When NI stays flat but FCF craters from $2.3B to $0.6B, the "earnings" are likely an accounting fiction. We are seeing earnings without cash, which is the precursor to a massive write-down.
The Digital Bank Run: The "switching cost" moat is an illusion in the smartphone era. In a liquidity crisis, "lazy" customers become "fast" customers. A sudden flight of deposits would force FHN to borrow at predatory rates, crushing the Net Interest Margin instantly.
CRE Concentration: A structural collapse in Commercial Real Estate (CRE) in their core markets would turn their "commercial portfolio" into a graveyard of non-performing assets.
The Most Likely Death: The FCF decay. Over a 3–5 year horizon, the divergence between cash and accounting profit will likely force a reckoning, leading to a permanent impairment of capital.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF is a mathematical exercise; the FCF divergence is a warning.
Intrinsic value estimate: $37.85 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $28.39(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $18.93(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Fair to Expensive. If the stock is trading anywhere near the DCF estimate, we are paying for "polished brass" on a ship that is leaking cash.
Verdict: PASS
The divergence between Net Income and FCF is an unacceptable risk. The ROE is too mediocre to justify the structural fragility of a regional bank. There is no "wonderful" business here, only a fair one with suspicious plumbing.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.