Fox Corp

FOX· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
History1 mo agoWATCH|4 mo agoWATCH
WATCH

📜 Signal History & Model Audit Trail (2 Runs)

🟢 LATEST (2026-07-29)WATCHat $51.63
1 mo ago
● 2026-04-18WATCHat $58.53
4 mo ago
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
6.4%
FY2017–2025
Net Income
Free Cash Flow
9.4%
FY2017–2025
EPS (Diluted)
4.9%
FY2018–2025
Latest Metrics — SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.55x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$70.5B
Per Share (approx.)
25% Margin of Safety
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
9.4%
Latest FCF
$3.0B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2017$9.9B$1.5B
2018$10.2B$1.1B$0
2019$11.4B$2.3B$6.8B
2020$12.3B$2.0B$7.9B
2021$12.9B$2.2B$8.0B
2022$14.0B$1.6B$7.2B
2023$14.9B$1.4B$7.2B
2024$14.0B$1.5B$7.2B
2025$16.3B$3.0B$6.6B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

Fox Corp (FOX) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren’s voice)

  • Pricing power is real and visible. Fox News and live sports are must-have for pay-TV distributors. Affiliate fees rose enough to offset 4-6% annual sub losses — revenue grew 64% in 8 years. That’s a moat, even if narrowing.
  • Free cash flow is exceptional. $3.0B in FY2025 on $16.3B revenue → 18.4% FCF margin. Debt is manageable ($6.6B, down from peak) and buybacks are aggressive. If cord-cutting slows or stabilizes, the mathematics turn massively in Fox’s favor.
  • Tubi is a real hedge. Ad-supported streaming grew fast — no disclosed numbers, but it diversifies away from linear decline. If Tubi becomes a $1B+ revenue stream with decent margins, it buys time for the core.
  • At what price? If the DCF of $70.5B (≈ $150/share assuming 470M shares) is remotely correct, the current stock price (≈ $45-50) offers a massive margin of safety — roughly 65-70% discount. Even if you haircut the DCF by half, you still get $75/share. Value is there if the model survives longer than the market expects.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

  • Permanent impairment scenario #1: The sports rights time bomb. Fox spent $6.2B on sports in FY2025 — that’s 38% of revenue. These contracts are long-term, escalating, and fixed. If cord-cutting accelerates (say 8-10% annually), affiliate fee hikes won’t keep up. The math breaks: revenue falls, costs stay high, margins collapse. This isn’t a recession — it’s a structural trap.

  • Permanent impairment scenario #2: The streaming super-app kills the bundle. Imagine Amazon, Apple, or Disney/ESPN launch a direct-to-consumer sports bundle that includes NFL, MLB, and college football — all the content Fox currently holds exclusive on linear. Pay-TV distributors lose leverage, affiliate fees plummet. Fox’s only remaining asset is Fox News (still valuable, but not enough to support the current cost structure). This is the most likely kill shot, timeframe 3-7 years.

  • Permanent impairment scenario #3: Opaque accounting hides the rot. No net income disclosed. No equity. No ROE. Management hides inside a Murdoch-controlled shell. If they’re booking paper profits while cash lags — or if debt was used to paper over declining operations — the real deterioration is invisible until it’s too late. This is a trust issue, and Buffett never invests without trust.

  • Most likely outcome: Slow bleed over 5-10 years, with intermittent spikes of fear. The DCF assumes 9.4% FCF growth — that’s fantasy given the structural headwinds. Real FCF will decline as sports costs outgrow revenue. The $70.5B DCF is fiction.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $75/share (40% haircut on the DCF to account for structural decline and opaque accounting). That’s generous — assumes the model holds for another decade before terminal erosion.
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $56/share (conservative buy zone).
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $37/share (Buffett’s ideal — only if you believe the business won’t be impaired for 20+ years).
  • Current price (~$45-50): Slightly below the conservative entry, but far above the 50% safety price. At this price, you’re not getting a margin of safety for the risks — you’re just getting a fair price for a declining asset. Not cheap enough to compensate for the structural risk.

Verdict: WATCH

The business has real cash generation and pricing power, but the underlying model is decaying faster than management admits, and the opaque accounting makes trust impossible. At $37/share, a 50% margin of safety might justify a small bet — but at current prices, the downside from cord-cutting acceleration and sports cost inflation outweighs the upside. Until the DCF becomes a conservative floor rather than a hopeful ceiling, Fox belongs on the watchlist, not in the portfolio.

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.