Fox Corp

FOXA· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
WATCH
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
6.4%
FY2017–2025
Net Income
Free Cash Flow
9.4%
FY2017–2025
EPS (Diluted)
4.9%
FY2018–2025
Latest Metrics — SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.55x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$70.5B
Per Share (approx.)
25% Margin of Safety
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
9.4%
Latest FCF
$3.0B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2017$9.9B$1.5B
2018$10.2B$1.1B$0
2019$11.4B$2.3B$6.8B
2020$12.3B$2.0B$7.9B
2021$12.9B$2.2B$8.0B
2022$14.0B$1.6B$7.2B
2023$14.9B$1.4B$7.2B
2024$14.0B$1.5B$7.2B
2025$16.3B$3.0B$6.6B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

Fox Corp (FOXA) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Ultimate Toll-Bridge: Fox doesn't sell "content"; it sells access. As long as the NFL and major league sports remain the "glue" holding the cable bundle together, Fox owns the bridge. They don't need to innovate; they just need to collect the toll.
  • Exceptional Pricing Power: This is a classic oligopoly. Cable distributors (Comcast, Charter) cannot drop Fox without triggering a mass exodus of subscribers. This gives Fox outsized leverage to hike affiliate fees, effectively transferring wealth from the distributor to the shareholder.
  • The "Live" Advantage: In a world of Netflix and Disney+, live is the only thing that cannot be time-shifted or easily pirated without losing value. News and Sports are the last bastions of linear television.
  • Attractive Entry: If the business can maintain its current state—even without growth—the gap between the market price and intrinsic value is a yawning chasm. Berkshire enters when the market mistakes industry decline for business failure.
  • Target Range: Genuinely attractive if the market cap stays below $40B, providing a massive cushion against the inevitable decay of the cable bundle.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”

  • The Cord-Cutting Cliff: The "toll-bridge" only works if people are still on the road. We aren't facing a recession; we are facing a structural migration. Once the "sports glue" fails or the NFL moves to a fully digital sovereign (Amazon/Google), the affiliate fee model collapses to zero.
  • The Content Arms Race: Fox is a price-taker when it comes to sports rights. If the NFL doubles the cost of broadcast rights, the FCF "treadmill" doesn't just stand still—it runs backward. They are locked in a bidding war against tech giants with infinite balance sheets.
  • The "Magic Bean" FCF: A jump from $1.5B to $3.0B in 2025 is not a business improvement; it's an accounting curiosity or a one-time windfall. Buying a business based on an anomaly is how you lose money in a hurry.
  • Most Likely Failure: The "Slow Bleed." The gradual erosion of the cable bundle over the next 5–7 years, where pricing power is offset by shrinking volume, leading to a permanent impairment of the asset.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

Reacting to the $70.5B DCF estimate:

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $146.87 per share (Based on $70.5B total valuation / ~480M shares).
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $110.15 (Conservative).
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $73.44 (Buffett's ideal).
  • Current Status: Deeply Cheap. The market is pricing this as a dying dinosaur, while the DCF suggests a powerhouse. However, the "treadmill" FCF suggests the DCF may be overly optimistic about terminal growth.

Verdict: WATCH

The gap between price and value is seductive, but the FCF stagnation is a flashing red light. We do not buy "cheap" businesses that are trending toward zero; we buy great businesses at fair prices. Until management proves the $3.0B FCF spike is a repeatable reality and not a fluke, we wait for the 50% margin of safety.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.