Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✗EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2017
$9.9B
—
$1.5B
—
—
—
—
—
2018
$10.2B
—
$1.1B
—
—
—
$0
—
2019
$11.4B
—
$2.3B
—
—
—
$6.8B
—
2020
$12.3B
—
$2.0B
—
—
—
$7.9B
—
2021
$12.9B
—
$2.2B
—
—
—
$8.0B
—
2022
$14.0B
—
$1.6B
—
—
—
$7.2B
—
2023
$14.9B
—
$1.4B
—
—
—
$7.2B
—
2024
$14.0B
—
$1.5B
—
—
—
$7.2B
—
2025
$16.3B
—
$3.0B
—
—
—
$6.6B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Fox Corp (FOXA) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll-Bridge: Fox doesn't sell "content"; it sells access. As long as the NFL and major league sports remain the "glue" holding the cable bundle together, Fox owns the bridge. They don't need to innovate; they just need to collect the toll.
Exceptional Pricing Power: This is a classic oligopoly. Cable distributors (Comcast, Charter) cannot drop Fox without triggering a mass exodus of subscribers. This gives Fox outsized leverage to hike affiliate fees, effectively transferring wealth from the distributor to the shareholder.
The "Live" Advantage: In a world of Netflix and Disney+, live is the only thing that cannot be time-shifted or easily pirated without losing value. News and Sports are the last bastions of linear television.
Attractive Entry: If the business can maintain its current state—even without growth—the gap between the market price and intrinsic value is a yawning chasm. Berkshire enters when the market mistakes industry decline for business failure.
Target Range: Genuinely attractive if the market cap stays below $40B, providing a massive cushion against the inevitable decay of the cable bundle.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The Cord-Cutting Cliff: The "toll-bridge" only works if people are still on the road. We aren't facing a recession; we are facing a structural migration. Once the "sports glue" fails or the NFL moves to a fully digital sovereign (Amazon/Google), the affiliate fee model collapses to zero.
The Content Arms Race: Fox is a price-taker when it comes to sports rights. If the NFL doubles the cost of broadcast rights, the FCF "treadmill" doesn't just stand still—it runs backward. They are locked in a bidding war against tech giants with infinite balance sheets.
The "Magic Bean" FCF: A jump from $1.5B to $3.0B in 2025 is not a business improvement; it's an accounting curiosity or a one-time windfall. Buying a business based on an anomaly is how you lose money in a hurry.
Most Likely Failure: The "Slow Bleed." The gradual erosion of the cable bundle over the next 5–7 years, where pricing power is offset by shrinking volume, leading to a permanent impairment of the asset.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Reacting to the $70.5B DCF estimate:
Intrinsic value estimate: $146.87 per share (Based on $70.5B total valuation / ~480M shares).
25% margin of safety entry: $110.15(Conservative).
50% margin of safety entry: $73.44(Buffett's ideal).
Current Status: Deeply Cheap. The market is pricing this as a dying dinosaur, while the DCF suggests a powerhouse. However, the "treadmill" FCF suggests the DCF may be overly optimistic about terminal growth.
Verdict: WATCH
The gap between price and value is seductive, but the FCF stagnation is a flashing red light. We do not buy "cheap" businesses that are trending toward zero; we buy great businesses at fair prices. Until management proves the $3.0B FCF spike is a repeatable reality and not a fluke, we wait for the 50% margin of safety.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.