Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$1.4B
$97.2M
$210.7M
$121.1M
24.2%
6.7%
$903.7M
$67.3M
2017
$1.7B
$157.8M
$224.1M
$176.5M
28.5%
9.4%
$935.1M
$138.5M
2018
$2.0B
$238.3M
$199.6M
$238.1M
31.3%
11.8%
$900.8M
$224.5M
2019
$2.2B
$252.0M
$248.1M
$252.0M
24.4%
11.4%
$832.2M
$322.9M
2020
$2.5B
$350.6M
$424.4M
$357.2M
25.2%
14.1%
$834.0M
$655.1M
2021
$3.7B
$550.5M
$301.2M
$532.5M
24.9%
14.7%
$882.1M
$147.3M
2022
$4.6B
$399.5M
-$27.7M
$469.5M
17.7%
8.8%
$1.4B
$132.7M
2023
$4.0B
$214.6M
$392.6M
$252.1M
9.2%
5.3%
$1.4B
$201.0M
2024
$4.3B
$316.3M
$604.6M
$351.4M
12.7%
7.4%
$1.2B
$281.3M
2025
$4.2B
$159.6M
$268.1M
$184.5M
6.1%
3.8%
$1.2B
$341.4M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
GENERAC HOLDINGS INC. (GNRC) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
We aren't looking for a "good" company; we are looking for a wonderful business at a fair price. Is this it?
The "Peace of Mind" Monopoly: Generac isn't selling engines; they are selling certainty. In a world of aging infrastructure and volatile weather, they own the dominant "insurance" brand for the home. Their distribution network is a formidable barrier to entry.
The Ecosystem Pivot: If management successfully transitions from selling a box (transactional) to managing the home's energy (recurring), the multiple expands. Turning a hardware company into a utility-style service provider is how you create a compounder.
Operational Scale: Their cost advantage allows them to squeeze competitors on price while maintaining a dominant shelf presence. Scale is a weapon, provided you have a target.
Attractive Entry: Berkshire only moves when the market is panicked. If the stock is priced for a permanent decline, but the grid remains fragile, the asymmetry becomes irresistible.
Price for Interest: I would only consider this if the price reflects a deeply impaired business, as the current capital efficiency doesn't justify a premium.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.” Here is where this business expires:
The "Tesla" Displacement: The structural threat isn't a recession; it's the obsolescence of the internal combustion engine. If integrated solar + battery storage (Powerwalls, etc.) reaches a price-performance parity that renders gas generators a "legacy" product, the moat evaporates. This isn't a dip; it's a cliff.
The Diworsification Spiral: Management is exhibiting the classic "Empire Builder" syndrome. Buying Ageto and Wolverine while core ROE collapses from 31.3% to 6.1% is a red flag. They are spending cash to buy growth because they can no longer create it organically.
The Accounting Mirage: The divergence between Net Income and Free Cash Flow is a flashing siren. When $0.4B in profit yields $0.0B in cash, you aren't running a business; you're running a spreadsheet. Paper profits don't pay dividends.
Most Likely Failure: The "Clean Energy" pivot becomes a capital-intensive treadmill. They will burn through their remaining cash and increase their $1.2B debt load to chase a market where they have no pricing power. Timeframe: 3–5 years.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF provides a ceiling, not a floor.
Intrinsic value estimate: $84.25 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $63.19(Conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $42.13(Buffett's ideal)
Current Assessment: At a DCF of $84.25, the business is fairly valued only if you believe the current decay is temporary. Given the collapse in ROE and the NI/FCF gap, the "intrinsic value" is likely overstated because it assumes a terminal growth that the current margins cannot support. It is currently an expensive bet on a turnaround.
Verdict: PASS
The collapse of capital efficiency from 31.3% to 6.1% is a structural failure, not a cyclical dip. We do not buy businesses where the accountants are working harder than the engineers. Until the FCF catches up to the reported earnings, this is a "no" at any price above $42.13.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.