Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
–Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✗EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$6.6B
$338.0M
$993.0M
$374.0M
5.7%
5.1%
—
$1.1B
2017
$8.1B
$1.1B
$791.0M
$1.4B
64.2%
13.3%
—
$570.0M
2018
$8.9B
$764.0M
$1.2B
$1.0B
138.7%
8.6%
—
$403.0M
2019
$9.5B
$881.0M
$1.3B
$1.1B
—
9.3%
—
$538.0M
2020
$4.3B
-$715.0M
$662.0M
-$430.0M
—
-16.6%
—
$3.2B
2021
$5.8B
$410.0M
$74.0M
$563.0M
—
7.1%
—
$1.4B
2022
$8.8B
$1.3B
$1.6B
$1.4B
—
14.3%
—
$1.2B
2023
$10.2B
$1.1B
$1.8B
$1.1B
—
11.1%
—
$800.0M
2024
$11.2B
$1.5B
$1.9B
$1.6B
—
13.7%
—
$1.3B
2025
$12.0B
$1.5B
$2.0B
$1.5B
—
12.1%
—
$918.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. (HLT) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Royalty Machine: Hilton isn't a hotel company; it’s a global licensing business. They’ve successfully offloaded the pain (CapEx, renovations, labor disputes) onto property owners while retaining the profit (franchise fees and management cuts).
The Honors Flywheel: The true asset isn't the physical building—it’s the guest database. Every new hotel owner wants to join the network to access 190M+ members; every member wants to stay at Hilton for the points. This is a classic, self-reinforcing network effect.
Shareholder Yield: Because the business requires almost zero maintenance capital, they can return nearly every dollar of free cash flow to shareholders through aggressive buybacks. They are shrinking the share count while growing the royalty stream.
Attractive Entry: When the market temporarily forgets that brands compound, we buy. At a significant discount to intrinsic value, you are buying a permanent, inflation-hedged claim on global hospitality.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Munger’s rule: "Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."
The Intermediary Trap: The greatest threat to Hilton is losing the customer interface to the OTAs (Online Travel Agencies) like Expedia or booking giants. If the guest stops caring about the "Hilton" brand and only cares about the cheapest room on an aggregator, Hilton ceases to be a premium brand and becomes a low-margin commodity utility.
The Permanent Business Travel Shift: If corporations successfully decouple "meetings" from "physical presence" via superior remote collaboration tech, the highest-margin segment of Hilton’s business—the corporate transient traveler—suffers a permanent, secular decline.
Franchise Revolts: The model relies on extracting fees from owners. If Hilton pushes fee increases too far, or if property performance lags, the owners—who hold the leverage of the physical assets—will defect to competitors like Marriott or independent boutique brands, eroding the network effect from within.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF analysis yields an intrinsic value of $90.05 per share. Given that current market prices are likely trading at a significant premium to this conservative calculation, the stock is currently expensive.
Intrinsic value estimate: $90.05
25% margin of safety entry: $67.54
50% margin of safety entry: $45.03
Note: We rarely find high-quality toll bridges like Hilton trading at a 50% discount, but we refuse to overpay for quality that is already priced for perfection.
Verdict: WATCH
Hilton is an exceptional capital-light business, but the current market valuation provides no cushion for the structural risks of disintermediation or shifting travel patterns. We will maintain our watch list and wait for a market panic to bring this compounder back to our price. If the world stops traveling for a quarter, we’ll be ready to buy.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.