10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$30.3B
$3.2B
—
—
10.1%
10.4%
—
$13.0B
2017
$28.9B
$344.0M
—
—
1.5%
1.2%
—
$9.6B
2018
$30.9B
$1.9B
—
—
9.0%
6.2%
—
$4.9B
2019
$29.1B
$1.0B
—
—
6.1%
3.6%
—
$3.8B
2020
$27.0B
-$322.0M
—
—
-2.0%
-1.2%
$14.8B
$4.2B
2021
$27.8B
$3.4B
—
—
17.2%
12.3%
$12.5B
$4.0B
2022
$28.5B
$868.0M
—
—
4.4%
3.0%
$11.9B
$4.2B
2023
$29.1B
$2.0B
—
—
9.6%
7.0%
$11.7B
$4.3B
2024
$30.1B
$2.6B
—
—
10.4%
8.6%
$17.7B
$14.8B
2025
$34.3B
$57.0M
—
—
0.2%
0.2%
$21.7B
$5.8B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co (HPE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Plumbing" Thesis: The moat isn't a fortress; it's institutional inertia. Large enterprises are terrified of the operational risk associated with ripping out their core infrastructure. This creates a predictable, if stagnant, revenue stream from a captive customer base.
The AI Pivot: If the shift toward AI-integrated servers and the Juniper acquisition can transform HPE from a hardware vendor into a high-margin orchestrator of hybrid cloud, the current carnage is merely a trough.
Asset Play: There is value in the global distribution network and the existing enterprise relationships. If a visionary leader could slash the overhead and optimize the balance sheet, the "mud moat" could be paved into a highway.
Attractive Price: This becomes interesting only if it is priced as a deep-value "cigar butt"—where the market has priced in a total collapse of the hardware business, leaving the AI and networking upside as a free call option. We would need to see it trade at a significant discount to its tangible book value, minus the $21.7B debt.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The Commodity Death Spiral: HPE is fighting a war of attrition in a commodity market. When margins collapse to 0.2%, you aren't running a business; you're running a charity for your customers. The most likely scenario is a permanent loss of pricing power as hyperscalers (AWS/Azure) make on-premise "plumbing" obsolete.
The Leverage Trap: Adding $4B in debt (totaling $21.7B) to fund the Juniper acquisition while net income is plummeting to $0.1B is financial suicide. If interest rates stay "higher for longer" or revenue dips further, the debt service will swallow the remaining crumbs of profit.
The "Black Box" Cash Flow: The absence of clear FCF data is the ultimate warning sign. A company that earns "accounting profit" but cannot show the cash is usually hiding a dying business model through aggressive capitalization or accounting gymnastics.
Most Likely Outcome: A slow, agonizing decline into irrelevance over the next 3–5 years, punctuated by asset fire-sales to pay down the Juniper debt.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The provided data makes a DCF impossible. You cannot project cash flows when the cash is invisible and the margins are nonexistent. We must value this as a distressed asset.
Intrinsic value estimate: $12.00(Based on a liquidation value of assets minus the massive debt load and negligible earnings power).
25% margin of safety entry: $9.00(Conservative).
50% margin of safety entry: $6.00(Buffett's ideal).
Current Status: Expensive. Any price above $12.00 ignores the reality that the company is effectively earning 0% on its capital.
Verdict: PASS
The business is a capital incinerator with a "moat" made of mud. We cannot invest in a company where revenue growth is bought with margin collapse and debt. There is no margin of safety when there is no visible cash.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.