Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.

ICE· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
History1 mo agoWATCH|4 mo agoBUY
WATCH

📜 Signal History & Model Audit Trail (2 Runs)

🟢 LATEST (2026-07-29)WATCHat $152.72
IV: $258.451 mo ago
● 2026-04-17BUY
IV: $258.454 mo ago
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
10.4%
FY2015–2025
Net Income
10.0%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
14.4%
FY2015–2025
EPS (Diluted)
28.9%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
11.5%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
2.4%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
26.2%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.64x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$146.5B
Per Share (approx.)
$258.45
25% Margin of Safety
$193.83
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$129.22
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
14.4%
Latest FCF
$4.3B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$6.0B$1.4B$1.9B$1.8B9.1%23.9%$6.4B$1.4B
2017$5.8B$2.5B$1.9B$2.8B14.9%43.2%$6.1B$1.6B
2018$6.3B$2.0B$2.4B$2.4B11.6%31.7%$7.4B
2019$6.5B$1.9B$2.5B$2.4B11.2%29.5%$7.8B
2020$8.2B$2.1B$2.7B$2.6B10.7%25.3%$16.5B
2021$9.2B$4.1B$2.9B$4.9B17.9%44.3%$13.9B
2022$9.6B$1.4B$3.3B$2.3B6.4%15.0%$18.1B$1.8B
2023$9.9B$2.4B$3.4B$3.4B9.2%23.9%$20.7B$899.0M
2024$11.8B$2.8B$4.2B$3.9B10.0%23.4%$17.3B$844.0M
2025$12.6B$3.3B$4.3B$4.5B11.5%26.2%$18.6B$837.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (ICE) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The moat is a triple lock: network effects (liquidity begets liquidity on NYSE and energy derivatives), switching costs (Black Knight mortgage software is embedded in lender workflows), and regulatory barriers (central clearinghouse designation is a government-issued tollbooth). None of these erode quickly.
  • Economics are exceptional in the core: Exchanges and clearing produce high incremental margins. Recurring revenue (data subscriptions, listing fees, mortgage tech) now dominates, making cash flows predictable. FCF ($4.3B) consistently exceeds net income – no accounting fudge.
  • Pricing power is real: They raised listing and data fees without volume collapse. Revenue doubled from $6B to $12.6B in a decade while net income tripled. The tollbooth works.
  • At what price? The DCF gives $258.45/share intrinsic value. If the market offers below $194 (25% margin of safety), the economics become compelling even with debt. Below $129 (50% margin), it’s a Buffett bargain – you buy the network at a price that assumes no growth and full debt repayment.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”

  • Scenario 1: DeFi eats clearing. If blockchain-based smart contracts replace central counterparty clearing for energy and credit derivatives, the network effect dissolves. Regulatory inertia buys a decade, not two – but the threat is structural, not cyclical. ICE becomes a legacy NYSE with declining volumes and no pricing power.
  • Scenario 2: Debt suffocation. $18.6B in debt – 1.5x revenue – with rising interest costs. If rates stay elevated or a recession hits mortgage tech (Black Knight), cash flow gets squeezed. ROA of 2.4% means every dollar of assets earns almost nothing. Debt-funded acquisitions (Ellie Mae, Black Knight) added scale, not quality. A refinancing crisis or covenant breach is permanent damage.
  • Scenario 3: The acquisition treadmill breaks. Management’s empire-building has inflated goodwill to ~$15B+. If they stop buying, growth stalls. If they keep buying, ROE stays mediocre (11.5%) and the debt pile grows. No compounding machine – just spinning in place.
  • Most likely over 10 years: DeFi is real but slow; debt risk is near-term. The structural threat is capital allocation addiction – management will destroy value by overpaying for the next deal, levering up again, and buying back stock at too-high prices.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

  • DCF estimate: $258.45/share (14.4% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal). Reasonable base case.
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $193.84/share – buys the moat at a discount to fair value, but still assumes management doesn’t blow up the balance sheet.
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $129.23/share – Buffett’s ideal: you’re paying for the network effect and ignoring management’s capital allocation sins entirely.
  • Current context: At ~$200 (rough estimate), ICE trades near the 25% margin line – it’s fair to slightly cheap on a pure DCF basis, but the debt and management quality discount are not priced in. No obvious mispricing.

Verdict: WATCH

The moat is real and durable, but the $18.6B debt and management’s empire-building record mean we need a larger margin of safety than a 10% discount to DCF. At $130–$160, this becomes a buy – the tollbooth is cheap enough to ignore the operator’s flaws. Above $200, we pass: the risk of permanent impairment from debt or a bad acquisition exceeds the upside.

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.