Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$6.0B
$1.4B
$1.9B
$1.8B
9.1%
23.9%
$6.4B
$1.4B
2017
$5.8B
$2.5B
$1.9B
$2.8B
14.9%
43.2%
$6.1B
$1.6B
2018
$6.3B
$2.0B
$2.4B
$2.4B
11.6%
31.7%
$7.4B
—
2019
$6.5B
$1.9B
$2.5B
$2.4B
11.2%
29.5%
$7.8B
—
2020
$8.2B
$2.1B
$2.7B
$2.6B
10.7%
25.3%
$16.5B
—
2021
$9.2B
$4.1B
$2.9B
$4.9B
17.9%
44.3%
$13.9B
—
2022
$9.6B
$1.4B
$3.3B
$2.3B
6.4%
15.0%
$18.1B
$1.8B
2023
$9.9B
$2.4B
$3.4B
$3.4B
9.2%
23.9%
$20.7B
$899.0M
2024
$11.8B
$2.8B
$4.2B
$3.9B
10.0%
23.4%
$17.3B
$844.0M
2025
$12.6B
$3.3B
$4.3B
$4.5B
11.5%
26.2%
$18.6B
$837.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (ICE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The moat is a triple lock: network effects (liquidity begets liquidity on NYSE and energy derivatives), switching costs (Black Knight mortgage software is embedded in lender workflows), and regulatory barriers (central clearinghouse designation is a government-issued tollbooth). None of these erode quickly.
Economics are exceptional in the core: Exchanges and clearing produce high incremental margins. Recurring revenue (data subscriptions, listing fees, mortgage tech) now dominates, making cash flows predictable. FCF ($4.3B) consistently exceeds net income – no accounting fudge.
Pricing power is real: They raised listing and data fees without volume collapse. Revenue doubled from $6B to $12.6B in a decade while net income tripled. The tollbooth works.
At what price? The DCF gives $258.45/share intrinsic value. If the market offers below $194 (25% margin of safety), the economics become compelling even with debt. Below $129 (50% margin), it’s a Buffett bargain – you buy the network at a price that assumes no growth and full debt repayment.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
Scenario 1: DeFi eats clearing. If blockchain-based smart contracts replace central counterparty clearing for energy and credit derivatives, the network effect dissolves. Regulatory inertia buys a decade, not two – but the threat is structural, not cyclical. ICE becomes a legacy NYSE with declining volumes and no pricing power.
Scenario 2: Debt suffocation.$18.6B in debt – 1.5x revenue – with rising interest costs. If rates stay elevated or a recession hits mortgage tech (Black Knight), cash flow gets squeezed. ROA of 2.4% means every dollar of assets earns almost nothing. Debt-funded acquisitions (Ellie Mae, Black Knight) added scale, not quality. A refinancing crisis or covenant breach is permanent damage.
Scenario 3: The acquisition treadmill breaks. Management’s empire-building has inflated goodwill to ~$15B+. If they stop buying, growth stalls. If they keep buying, ROE stays mediocre (11.5%) and the debt pile grows. No compounding machine – just spinning in place.
Most likely over 10 years: DeFi is real but slow; debt risk is near-term. The structural threat is capital allocation addiction – management will destroy value by overpaying for the next deal, levering up again, and buying back stock at too-high prices.
25% margin of safety entry: $193.84/share – buys the moat at a discount to fair value, but still assumes management doesn’t blow up the balance sheet.
50% margin of safety entry: $129.23/share – Buffett’s ideal: you’re paying for the network effect and ignoring management’s capital allocation sins entirely.
Current context: At ~$200 (rough estimate), ICE trades near the 25% margin line – it’s fair to slightly cheap on a pure DCF basis, but the debt and management quality discount are not priced in. No obvious mispricing.
Verdict: WATCH
The moat is real and durable, but the $18.6B debt and management’s empire-building record mean we need a larger margin of safety than a 10% discount to DCF. At $130–$160, this becomes a buy – the tollbooth is cheap enough to ignore the operator’s flaws. Above $200, we pass: the risk of permanent impairment from debt or a bad acquisition exceeds the upside.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.