Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$2.1B
$271.1M
$361.7M
$319.8M
17.6%
12.8%
$1.0B
$236.0M
2017
$2.3B
$337.3M
$388.9M
$377.6M
17.9%
14.7%
$862.2M
$375.9M
2018
$2.5B
$410.6M
$423.3M
$432.0M
20.6%
16.5%
$851.1M
$466.4M
2019
$2.5B
$425.5M
$477.2M
$451.5M
18.8%
17.1%
$848.9M
$632.6M
2020
$2.4B
$377.8M
$517.7M
$409.7M
14.9%
16.1%
$1.0B
$1.0B
2021
$2.8B
$449.4M
$492.6M
$479.7M
16.0%
16.3%
$1.2B
$855.4M
2022
$3.2B
$586.9M
$489.4M
$638.6M
19.3%
18.4%
$1.5B
$430.2M
2023
$3.3B
$596.1M
$626.8M
$658.3M
16.8%
18.2%
$1.3B
$534.3M
2024
$3.3B
$505.0M
$603.0M
$508.4M
13.3%
15.4%
$2.0B
$620.8M
2025
$3.5B
$483.2M
$616.8M
$495.4M
12.0%
14.0%
$1.8B
$580.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
IDEX CORP /DE/ (IEX) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Toll Bridge" Model: IDEX doesn't sell luxuries; they sell mission-critical components. When a valve is embedded in a multi-million dollar medical diagnostic tool or a chemical plant, the cost of the part is negligible compared to the catastrophic risk of replacing it with an unproven alternative.
Pricing Power by Default: Because the switching costs are so high, IDEX possesses a natural ability to raise prices to offset inflation without losing customers. It is a business of necessity, not preference.
Diversified Resilience: By operating across health, science, and industrial sectors, they avoid the "single-point-of-failure" risk. If industrial Capex dips, health-tech spending often offsets it.
The Entry Price: This becomes attractive only when the market forgets the value of the "lock-in" and prices it like a generic industrial manufacturer. We want it at a price where the stagnant growth is already baked in, leaving the moat as a free call option.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Roll-Up Treadmill: Management is addicted to acquisitions to mask organic stagnation. This is the classic "empire-building" trap: buying growth at high multiples to report revenue increases, while the actual return on invested capital (ROIC) decays. If the music stops (credit tightens or multiples compress), the facade collapses.
Structural Obsolescence: The moat is "switching costs," but that only works if the technology remains relevant. If a competitor introduces a disruptive, modular, "plug-and-play" fluidics platform that removes the need for specialized integration, the lock-in vanishes overnight.
The ROE Death Spiral: A falling ROE (now 12.0%) suggests the company is becoming less efficient at generating profit from its capital. A business that requires constant shopping to stay relevant is not a compounder; it's a collector.
Most Likely Failure: The "Treadmill Effect." Over the next 3–5 years, the most likely scenario is a continued slide in ROE as they overpay for mediocre acquisitions to maintain the illusion of growth, effectively destroying shareholder value through capital misallocation.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $162.83 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $122.12(conservative).
50% margin of safety entry: $81.42(Buffett's ideal).
Current Status: Expensive/Fair. At the current DCF valuation, we are paying for a growth rate (6.9%) that management is struggling to achieve organically. We are paying a premium for a moat that is visibly leaking.
Verdict: PASS
The business has a decent moat, but management is using acquisitions as a prosthetic for organic growth. We do not buy "empire builders" at fair value. Unless the price drops to $122 or lower, the risk of capital misallocation outweighs the stability of the switching costs.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.