JONES LANG LASALLE INC

JLL· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
19.3%
FY2013–2025
Net Income
11.4%
FY2013–2025
Free Cash Flow
85.4%
FY2013–2014
EPS (Diluted)
49.7%
FY2013–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
10.6%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
4.4%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
3.0%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.04x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$16.4B
Per Share (approx.)
$349.32
25% Margin of Safety
$261.99
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$174.66
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
8.0%
Latest FCF
$769.9M

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2014$5.4B$386.1M$342.0M$323.5M16.2%7.1%$275.0M$250.4M
2017$14.5B$276.4M8.2%1.9%
2018$16.3B$484.5M13.1%3.0%$480.9M
2019$18.0B$535.3M10.5%3.0%$451.9M
2020$16.6B$402.5M7.3%2.4%$574.3M
2021$19.4B$961.6M15.5%5.0%$593.7M
2022$20.9B$654.5M10.9%3.1%$519.3M
2023$20.8B$225.4M3.6%1.1%$410.0M
2024$23.4B$546.8M8.1%2.3%$416.3M
2025$26.1B$792.1M10.6%3.0%$599.1M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

JONES LANG LASALLE INC (JLL) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Global Toll Booth: JLL occupies a strategic position as the primary intermediary for the world's largest corporations. They don't own the volatile real estate; they own the relationships and the data.
  • Institutional Gravity: While "inertia" is a cynical word, scale is a competitive advantage. When a Fortune 500 CEO needs to restructure a global portfolio across 40 countries, they don't hire 40 local boutiques; they hire JLL. This creates a steady, recurring stream of management fees that act as a floor for the business.
  • Optionality in Capital Markets: Their ability to pivot between leasing, management, and capital advisory allows them to capture fees regardless of whether the market is in a "buying" or "holding" phase.
  • Attractive Entry: If the business can stabilize margins and leverage its massive revenue base, any price significantly below $349.32 offers a window into a dominant global brand.
  • The Truth: This is not a "wonderful company at a fair price"; it is a dominant utility of the real estate world that is currently struggling to translate scale into profit.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

  • The Low-Margin Treadmill: The numbers are screaming. Revenue CAGR of 19.3% against a Net Income CAGR of 11.4% is the definition of unproductive growth. They are working harder and harder to make marginally more money.
  • Structural Disintermediation (The "PropTech" Cliff): The "outsourced brain" is being digitized. As AI and transparent listing platforms replace the need for a human middleman to "find the deal," JLL’s brokerage fees—the high-margin part of the business—will be bid down to zero.
  • The Death of the Office: This isn't a "recession" risk; it's a biological shift in how humans work. If the global demand for corporate square footage permanently shrinks, JLL is managing a dying asset class. They are the world's best captains of a sinking ship.
  • Capital Inefficiency: ROE dropping from 16.2% to 10.6% proves that management is destroying value relative to the capital employed. They are scaling for the sake of the top line, which is a vanity project, not a business strategy.
  • Most Likely Failure: A permanent compression of margins driven by tech-driven transparency, occurring over the next 5–10 years.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

The DCF assumes 8% FCF growth—a generous assumption given the margin collapse.

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $349.32 per share
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $261.99 (Conservative)
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $174.66 (Buffett's ideal)
  • Current Status: Unless the market is pricing this near the 50% MoS level, it is expensive. You are paying for revenue growth that doesn't reach the bottom line.

Verdict: PASS

The business is scaling a low-margin commodity service while its ROE is in retreat. We do not buy "treadmills," regardless of how large the treadmill is. The structural threats to the corporate office model create too much permanent impairment risk to justify the current valuation.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.