10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$96.6B
$24.7B
—
—
9.7%
25.6%
—
$391.2B
2017
$100.7B
$24.4B
—
—
9.6%
24.3%
—
$431.3B
2018
$108.8B
$32.5B
—
—
12.7%
29.9%
—
$278.8B
2019
$115.7B
$36.4B
—
—
13.9%
31.5%
—
—
2020
$120.0B
$29.1B
—
—
10.4%
24.3%
—
—
2021
$121.6B
$48.3B
—
—
16.4%
39.7%
—
—
2022
$128.7B
$37.7B
—
—
12.9%
29.3%
—
—
2023
$158.1B
$49.6B
—
—
15.1%
31.3%
—
—
2024
$177.6B
$58.5B
—
—
17.0%
32.9%
—
—
2025
$182.4B
$57.0B
—
—
15.7%
31.3%
—
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO (JPM) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Why the moat is durable: JPMorgan sits on a $1.6 trillion deposit base funded at near-zero cost — no competitor can replicate that in a decade. Switching costs on corporate treasury systems and personal banking are brutal. The global payments infrastructure (clearing, settlement, trade finance) is a natural monopoly.
What makes economics exceptional: Net interest income expands automatically when rates rise — no pricing decisions needed. Asset & Wealth Management collects recurring fees on $3.4 trillion AUS with zero capital intensity. ROE averaged ~13% over a decade and hit 17% in 2024 — far above the cost of equity.
Why it compounds: Retained earnings + buybacks at reasonable prices deliver 12.8% EPS CAGR vs. 8.8% net income CAGR. If management buys back at 10x earnings, that’s a 10% yield on reinvested capital. Dimon’s “fortress balance sheet” allows aggressive capital return without jeopardizing stability.
Attractive entry price: Intrinsic value at 12x normalized earnings (excluding one-time gains) is ~$240/share. A 25% margin of safety ($180) makes this a rare large-cap compounding machine. Below $160, it’s a Buffett-style “no-brainer.”
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Scenario 1: The Deposit Run
$1.3 trillion of uninsured deposits — that’s 81% of the deposit base. A fintech panic (e.g., Revolut offers 5% insured savings, deposits flee) forces JPM to sell liquid assets at fire-sale prices. The cheap funding disappears, net interest margin collapses.
Timeframe: Next systemic crisis (3–7 years). Likelihood: moderate, but the magnitude is lethal.
Scenario 2: Tech Disintermediation
A digital-native (Apple, Amazon, or a well-capitalized neobank) builds a near-zero-cost deposit platform with instant switching. JPM’s sticky corporate treasury relationships erode as CFOs adopt cheaper APIs. Payment processing margins compress to zero.
Timeframe: 10–15 years. Likelihood: high — this is a structural, not cyclical threat.
Scenario 3: Regulatory Re-Regulation
Post-crisis, regulators force JPM to hold more equity against deposits. ROE drops to 10%. The buyback machine stops. The stock trades at 8x earnings — permanently impaired.
Timeframe: 3–5 years (next crisis triggers new rules). Likelihood: low, but tail risk.
Most likely structural threat: Technology disintermediation over a decade. JPM’s moat is inertia, not innovation. The worst-case scenario: they become a slow-moving utility with declining returns.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
No reliable DCF due to missing free cash flow data. Use earnings power instead.
Normalized net income: $50B (strip out provision releases, one-time gains). EPS: ~$17 (assuming 2.9B shares).
Fair multiple: 12x (blue-chip bank with stable moat, but no growth catalyst). Intrinsic value: ~$204/share.
25% margin of safety entry:$153/share.
50% margin of safety entry:$102/share.
Current price (assumed ~$220) is 8% above intrinsic. Not cheap, not expensive — a “fair” stock with asymmetric downside risk if rates fall or deposits flee.
Verdict: WATCH
JPM is a fortress, but the price offers no margin of safety — buy only at $150 or below, where the deposit base and switching costs become a gift. The missing free cash flow and uninsured deposit risk demand a wide berth; we need a crisis to force a cheap entry. Until then, let the market prove the moat.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.