10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$13.3B
$1.2B
—
—
8.2%
8.9%
$5.1B
$2.7B
2017
$14.3B
$2.1B
—
—
12.0%
14.6%
$5.1B
$1.6B
2018
$16.4B
$1.6B
—
—
11.4%
10.0%
$5.7B
—
2019
$17.3B
$886.0M
—
—
4.5%
5.1%
$6.1B
—
2020
$17.4B
$499.0M
—
—
2.2%
2.9%
$6.3B
—
2021
$17.7B
$3.8B
—
—
19.0%
21.3%
$6.3B
—
2022
$18.8B
$1.4B
—
—
26.6%
7.2%
$6.3B
—
2023
$11.6B
-$752.0M
—
—
-10.9%
-6.5%
$5.8B
—
2024
$18.4B
$3.3B
—
—
39.6%
17.8%
$6.1B
—
2025
$18.2B
$1.2B
—
—
10.8%
6.5%
$6.3B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP (LNC) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Float Advantage: Like any insurance operation, LNC is a machine for generating float. They collect premiums today to pay claims tomorrow. If they can maintain a positive spread between the investment yield and the cost of that float, they are effectively using other people's money to bet on the economy.
Interest Rate Tailwinds: In a "higher for longer" rate environment, the new business being written carries significantly higher margins than the legacy books. The potential for a massive re-rating exists if they can pivot the portfolio toward higher-yielding assets without spiking the risk profile.
Scale as a Barrier: While the product is a commodity, the sheer volume of assets under management provides a level of institutional access and pricing power that a startup cannot replicate.
The "Cigar Butt" Price: This isn't a "wonderful business," but if the market prices it as a failing enterprise while the underlying book remains solvent, it becomes a classic value play.
Attractive Entry: This becomes interesting only when the price represents a deep discount to the adjusted book value—essentially getting the investment portfolio for free while the market pays for the liabilities.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
"Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."
The ALM Death Spiral: The most likely permanent impairment is an Asset-Liability Mismatch (ALM) failure. If their long-term guarantees are higher than what they can realistically earn on their bonds without taking reckless risks, they aren't an insurance company—they are a slow-motion train wreck.
Accounting Smoke & Mirrors: Net Income swinging from -$0.8B to $3.3B is a red flag the size of a stadium. When "earnings" are driven by mark-to-market adjustments rather than operational cash flow, you aren't investing in a business; you're betting on an accounting ledger.
The Solvency Trap: A structural shift in mortality or a sudden collapse in the credit quality of their corporate bond holdings would trigger a capital call. Given the lack of organic growth, they cannot "grow" their way out of a capital hole.
Most Likely Failure: The "accounting gymnastics" masking a permanent erosion of capital. Timeframe: 3–5 years as legacy policies mature and the true cost of liabilities is revealed.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The absence of FCF history makes a DCF a work of fiction. We must rely on Book Value and the "Casino" volatility of their Net Income.
Intrinsic value estimate: $32.00(Based on a conservative haircut to Book Value, assuming current volatility is a feature, not a bug).
25% margin of safety entry: $24.00(Conservative; protects against moderate mispricing).
50% margin of safety entry: $16.00(Buffett's ideal; the "Cigar Butt" zone where the downside is severely limited).
Current Status: Expensive/Fair relative to the risk. The market is pricing in a recovery that the operational data (3% CAGR) does not support.
Verdict: PASS
The lack of transparent cash flow and the violent swings in Net Income suggest a business that is unmanageable. We do not buy "casinos" where the house doesn't know the odds. Until the business demonstrates operational stability over accounting volatility, it stays off the ledger.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.