Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2017
$65.0B
$3.1B
$4.5B
$3.5B
48.0%
4.8%
—
$558.0M
2018
$68.6B
$3.4B
$3.9B
$3.9B
58.7%
5.0%
—
$588.0M
2019
$71.3B
$2.3B
$5.0B
$2.7B
63.5%
3.2%
—
$511.0M
2020
$72.1B
$4.3B
$2.8B
$4.2B
217.1%
5.9%
—
$716.0M
2021
$89.6B
$5.8B
$9.3B
$5.6B
406.1%
6.5%
—
$4.7B
2022
$96.3B
$8.4B
$8.3B
$8.5B
—
8.8%
$24.3B
$1.1B
2023
$97.1B
$6.4B
$6.8B
$6.6B
—
6.6%
$33.3B
$1.3B
2024
$86.4B
$7.7B
$6.2B
$7.7B
—
8.9%
$35.8B
$921.0M
2025
$83.7B
$7.0B
$7.7B
$7.0B
—
8.3%
$35.3B
$1.8B
2026
$86.3B
$6.7B
$7.7B
$6.6B
—
7.7%
$39.8B
$982.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
LOWES COMPANIES INC (LOW) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
We aren't buying a growth story; we are buying a massive, physical toll bridge to the American home.
The Duopoly Fortress: In the home improvement space, you have two giants. While they sell commodities, the cost of entry to compete is staggering. No one is building 1,700+ massive warehouses in a high-interest-rate environment.
The "Must-Have" Nature: People don't stop fixing leaks or replacing broken water heaters because the economy is soft. This is essential infrastructure for the homeowner.
Supplier Leverage: Because of their sheer volume, Lowe's doesn't just buy products; they dictate terms. That scale creates a cost advantage that allows them to survive price wars that would bankrupt a regional player.
The Professional Pivot: If they can successfully migrate from the "weekend warrior" (discretionary) to the "Pro contractor" (recurring), the revenue floor rises significantly.
Attractive Range: This becomes a Berkshire-style play when the price reflects a stagnant business, not a growing one. We want it at a price where we are paid to wait for the Pro-segment pivot to work.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The numbers are lying to us. Let's look at the rot.
The Revenue Death Spiral: Revenue dropping from $96.3B to $86.3B over four years isn't a "dip"—it's a structural decline. If the top line is shrinking, the business is dying in slow motion.
The ROE Mirage: An ROE of 406.1% is a parlor trick. It's not a result of operational excellence; it's a result of aggressive debt-loading and share buybacks that shrink the equity base. It is financial engineering, not business brilliance.
The Amazon/Direct-to-Consumer Leak: The "long tail" of home improvement (tools, decor, small fixtures) is being eaten by e-commerce. Lowe's is left with the "heavy stuff," which is the lowest margin and highest cost to move.
Most Likely Failure: The Equity Trap. The most likely scenario is a permanent stagnation of revenue coupled with a rising interest rate environment that makes their debt-financed capital structure a liability rather than a lever. Timeframe: 3–5 years.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF assumes growth that the current revenue trend contradicts.
Intrinsic value estimate: $287.69 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $215.77(Conservative: protects against mild decline).
50% margin of safety entry: $143.85(Buffett's ideal: accounts for the revenue decay).
Current Status: Fairly valued to slightly expensive. The market is pricing in a stability that the revenue trend ($96.3B → $86.3B) simply does not support.
Verdict: WATCH
The business is currently a financial engineering project masquerading as a compounder. We cannot buy a shrinking revenue stream at a "fair" price; we need a deep discount. Wait for a price closer to $215 before committing capital.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.