Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$15.4B
$808.0M
$1.4B
$766.0M
15.8%
5.2%
—
$858.0M
2017
$20.5B
$1.5B
$2.0B
$1.4B
40.7%
7.1%
—
$383.0M
2018
$20.8B
$1.9B
$1.8B
$1.6B
85.7%
9.2%
—
$316.0M
2019
$21.0B
$1.3B
$1.0B
$966.0M
181.1%
6.1%
$247.0M
$225.0M
2020
$10.6B
-$267.0M
$1.5B
-$80.0M
-62.1%
-2.5%
$143.0M
$877.0M
2021
$13.9B
$1.1B
$994.0M
$1.1B
77.7%
7.9%
$135.0M
$1.4B
2022
$20.8B
$2.4B
$2.0B
$2.1B
415.1%
11.4%
$92.0M
$507.0M
2023
$23.7B
$3.1B
$2.7B
$2.8B
—
13.0%
$56.0M
$338.0M
2024
$25.1B
$2.4B
$2.0B
$1.8B
—
9.5%
$55.0M
$396.0M
2025
$26.2B
$2.6B
—
—
—
9.9%
$23.0M
$358.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC /MD/ (MAR) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Tax" on Global Travel: Marriott is not in the hotel business; they are in the franchise and marketing business. They have successfully shifted the heavy lifting of real estate ownership to franchisees while maintaining control over the most valuable asset in the room: the reservation system.
The Bonvoy Moat: This is the "switch" that is hard to flip. Once a traveler is locked into the Bonvoy ecosystem, the switching costs are high—not just in points, but in the certainty of the experience. It creates a recurring customer cycle that independent hotels and smaller chains simply cannot replicate.
Unmatched Distribution Power: As a hotel owner, you have a simple choice: be a Marriott franchisee and fill your rooms, or remain independent and struggle to reach the global business traveler. This network effect is self-reinforcing; more hotels make the program better, which attracts more travelers, which makes the franchise more valuable.
Exceptional ROIC: Because they don’t own the depreciating assets (the buildings), Marriott’s return on invested capital is structurally higher than any traditional hotel company. They are essentially a software platform with a physical distribution network.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Platform Disintermediation (The Google Threat): The greatest risk is that the "middleman" gets bypassed. If Google or a tech aggregator becomes the primary interface for finding, comparing, and booking, the brand becomes less important than the price. If Marriott loses the top-of-funnel discovery, their franchise fees are vulnerable.
Owner Rebellion: Marriott extracts heavy fees. If their contribution to "heads in beds" (occupancy) stagnates due to market shifts, the owners—who hold the real estate risk—will revolt. If the owners stop seeing the ROI on their fees, Marriott’s supply of rooms will shrink or be converted to competitor brands.
The "Zoomification" of Business: We are seeing a structural, not cyclical, shift in business travel. If the corporate expense account is permanently reduced because of improved video technology, the high-margin segment of their business—corporate bookings—will atrophy. This isn't a recession; it is a permanent loss of the high-paying customer.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The market currently treats Marriott as a high-growth tech stock. Our conservative DCF suggests this is a dangerous assumption.
Intrinsic value estimate: $135.85 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $101.89
50% margin of safety entry: $67.93
Is it cheap, fair, or expensive?
It is Expensive. At current market trading levels, the stock is priced for perfection, ignoring the significant risk that global business travel habits have fundamentally changed. The market is paying a massive premium for a predictable fee stream that is far more vulnerable to platform disruption than investors care to admit.
Verdict: WATCH
Marriott is a wonderful, asset-light business with an iron-clad competitive advantage, but we are nowhere near the price required to create a margin of safety. We will continue to watch for a market dislocation or a systemic repricing that brings the share price down to our intrinsic value range. Until then, we keep our powder dry.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.