Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$24.6B
$4.7B
$4.2B
$4.4B
—
19.0%
$26.0B
$1.2B
2017
$22.8B
$5.2B
$3.7B
$4.7B
—
22.8%
$29.5B
$2.5B
2018
$21.3B
$5.9B
$4.2B
$3.4B
—
27.9%
$31.1B
$866.0M
2019
$21.4B
$6.0B
$5.7B
$3.9B
—
28.2%
$34.2B
$898.5M
2020
$19.2B
$4.7B
$4.6B
$3.4B
—
24.6%
$37.4B
$3.4B
2021
$23.2B
$7.5B
$7.1B
$5.8B
—
32.5%
$35.6B
$4.7B
2022
$23.2B
$6.2B
$5.5B
$4.6B
—
26.6%
$35.9B
$2.6B
2023
$25.5B
$8.5B
$7.3B
$6.5B
—
33.2%
$39.3B
$4.6B
2024
$25.9B
$8.2B
$6.7B
$5.9B
—
31.7%
$38.4B
$1.1B
2025
$26.9B
$8.6B
$7.2B
$5.7B
—
31.9%
$40.0B
$774.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
MCDONALDS CORP (MCD) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Bridge: This isn't a burger business; it's a real estate empire. By owning the land and collecting rent from franchisees, MCD has decoupled its profits from the headaches of flipping patties.
Institutional Ubiquity: 45,000+ locations create a "mental monopoly." The moat isn't the taste—it's the certainty. A traveler in a strange city chooses MCD because the risk of a bad meal is nearly zero. That's a powerful psychological moat.
Inflation Hedge: They possess a rare "stealth" pricing power. They can raise the price of a Big Mac by $0.25 and the customer barely notices, but that penny-margin flows straight to the bottom line.
Exceptional Economics: High-margin, recurring royalty streams with minimal CapEx requirements. It is a cash-flow machine that requires almost no new innovation to maintain its dominance.
Attractive Entry: For Berkshire to move, we need a price that recognizes this is a utility, not a growth stock. We look for a price that treats the real estate as the primary asset and the burgers as the marketing.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The "Lemon Squeeze" Collapse: Revenue CAGR of 0.6% is zombie growth. When NI grows (6.6%) while revenue stands still, you aren't growing; you are cannibalizing your partners. If franchisees feel the squeeze too harshly, the system breaks. A revolt of the operators is the primary structural risk.
The Cultural Pivot: We are betting on the permanence of the "Fast Food" habit. If a generational shift toward health or "slow food" becomes a structural mandate rather than a trend, the utility of that real estate plummets. Land is only valuable if the business on top of it works.
The Debt Trap: Climbing from $26.0B to $40.0B in debt while revenue is flat is financial engineering, not business building. They are using leverage to manufacture earnings per share. This is a "fair weather" strategy that fails when the cost of capital stays high.
Most Likely Failure: The Franchisee Friction. Over the next 5–10 years, the tension between corporate's desire for margins and the operator's ability to pay rent will reach a breaking point.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Based on the DCF provided: $116.2B total enterprise value.
Intrinsic value estimate: $163.58 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $122.69(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $81.79(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Grossly expensive. If the market price is anywhere near the current trading range (typically $250+), we are paying a massive premium for a company with dead revenue growth. We are essentially paying for growth that the numbers say isn't happening.
Verdict: PASS
The business is a wonderful machine, but the price is a fantasy. With revenue CAGR at 0.6% and rising debt, the margin of safety is non-existent. We do not buy "toll booths" when the toll is priced at a 100% premium to its intrinsic value.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.