MOODYS CORP /DE/

MCO· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
History1 mo agoWATCH|4 mo agoWATCH
WATCH

📜 Signal History & Model Audit Trail (2 Runs)

🟢 LATEST (2026-07-29)WATCHat $484.20
IV: $328.001 mo ago
● 2026-04-16WATCH
IV: $328.004 mo ago
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
8.3%
FY2015–2025
Net Income
10.1%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
8.8%
FY2015–2025
EPS (Diluted)
11.4%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
60.7%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
15.5%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
31.9%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
1.73x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$58.2B
Per Share (approx.)
$328.00
25% Margin of Safety
$246.00
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$164.00
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
8.8%
Latest FCF
$2.6B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$816.1M$266.6M$1.1B$278.1M32.7%$3.4B$2.1B
2017$975.2M$1.0B$664.0M$1.1B102.6%$5.4B$1.1B
2018$4.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B285.4%29.5%$5.7B$1.7B
2019$4.8B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B232.4%29.4%$5.6B$1.8B
2020$5.4B$1.8B$2.0B$1.9B113.3%33.1%$6.4B$2.6B
2021$6.2B$2.2B$1.9B$2.3B81.2%35.6%$7.4B$1.8B
2022$5.5B$1.4B$1.2B$1.4B54.5%25.1%$7.4B$1.8B
2023$5.9B$1.6B$1.9B$1.7B48.4%27.2%$7.0B$2.1B
2024$7.1B$2.1B$2.5B$2.2B57.7%29.0%$7.4B$2.4B
2025$7.7B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B60.7%31.9%$7.0B$2.4B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

MOODYS CORP /DE/ (MCO) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren’s voice)

  • Moat is a government-backed toll booth.

    • Moody’s ratings are legally required for most institutional debt. No issuer can bypass them without losing access to capital markets.
    • Moody’s Analytics subscriptions are woven into bank underwriting workflows – switching costs are essentially infinite.
  • Economics are exceptional – and improving.

    • MIS operating margin ~50% – pure toll-collecting with zero marginal cost per rating.
    • MA subscription revenue growing at ~20% CAGR – sticky, recurring, and increasingly dominant.
    • FCF conversion is pristine: $17.8B over 10 years vs $15.6B net income – cash is real, not accounting fiction.
  • At the right price, this is a generational compounder.

    • If you can buy below intrinsic value, the regulatory moat plus MA’s growth delivers a 10%+ real return for decades.
    • Intrinsic value (DCF): $328/share – but this assumes only 8.8% FCF growth. If MA accelerates or bond issuance recovers, true value is higher.
    • 25% margin of safety entry: $246/share – a price where even a bond-market freeze can’t permanently impair your return.
    • 50% margin of safety entry: $164/share – Buffett’s ideal: a business that prints cash, bought at a panic discount.
  • Why Berkshire would buy it (if cheap)

    • No capital intensity, no technological disruption risk for 20+ years.
    • Management automatically repurchases shares – but at the right price, buybacks are accretive.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”

  • Scenario #1: Regulatory obliteration (most likely permanent threat)

    • The SEC removes the mandatory rating requirement for investment-grade debt.
    • Alternative credit assessors (e.g., AI-driven platforms, self-certification) gain traction.
    • Timeline: 10–20 years. Probability: 20% over 20 years – regulators move slowly, but the risk is existential.
    • If this happens, MIS revenue collapses to zero. The toll booth vanishes. Moody’s becomes a mid-tier data provider.
  • Scenario #2: Secular decline in bond issuance

    • Corporate debt markets shrink due to de-leveraging, higher rates, or a shift to equity financing.
    • MIS revenue is already volatile (down 11% 2021→2022). A prolonged 30% drop would cut total revenue ~18%.
    • This isn’t a recession – it’s a structural trend. U.S. corporate debt/GDP is near all-time highs. Mean reversion would destroy Moody’s earnings power.
  • Scenario #3: Leverage + capital allocation poison

    • Debt is $7.0B – 2.7× equity. ROE is 60% only because book value is tiny.
    • Management buys back stock at 30× earnings – they are destroying $1 of value for every $0.70 spent.
    • A bond-market freeze + rising rates could push interest coverage below 3×. Moody’s would be forced to cut dividends or issue equity at the worst time.
    • This isn’t a moat problem – it’s a steward problem. Buffett would fire the CEO.
  • Most likely scenario over next 5 years:

    • No regulatory change, but MIS revenue stays lumpy. MA growth continues.
    • Returns are mediocre because the stock is already priced for perfection (current ~$450 = 37% above DCF intrinsic value).
    • You get a 6–7% annualized return from buybacks + growth – below Berkshire’s hurdle.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

  • DCF intrinsic value estimate: $328/share

    • Based on 8.8% FCF growth for 10 years, 10% discount rate, 3% terminal growth.
    • Assumptions are reasonable – FCF is $2.6B, growth is plausible given MA’s 20% CAGR and MIS cyclical recovery.
    • But the DCF is sensitive to terminal value – a 2% terminal growth drops intrinsic to $280.
  • Margin of safety prices:

    • 25% discount (conservative buy): $246/share
    • 50% discount (Buffett’s ideal): $164/share
  • Current price relative to value:

    • At ~$450 (recent market price), MCO trades at 1.37× intrinsic valueexpensive by 37%.
    • You are paying for perfection – 8.8% growth is already priced in. Any miss in MIS or MA growth leads to a 20%+ drawdown.

Verdict: WATCH

The business is a fortress – regulatory moat, sticky subscriptions, and irreplaceable cash flow. But at $450, the price offers no margin of safety and relies on flawless execution. Wait for a bear market in bonds or a regulatory scare to buy at $250 or below. Until then, let the greedy pay up.

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.