Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✗EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$60.8B
$850.0M
—
—
1.3%
1.4%
—
$12.7B
2017
$62.3B
$4.0B
—
—
6.8%
6.4%
—
$12.7B
2018
$67.9B
$5.1B
—
—
9.7%
7.5%
—
$15.8B
2019
$69.6B
$5.9B
—
—
8.9%
8.5%
—
$16.6B
2020
$67.8B
$5.4B
—
—
7.3%
8.0%
—
$19.8B
2021
$68.7B
$6.9B
—
—
10.2%
10.0%
—
$20.0B
2022
$68.8B
$5.3B
—
—
17.7%
7.7%
—
$20.2B
2023
$66.9B
$1.6B
—
—
5.3%
2.4%
—
$20.6B
2024
$71.0B
$4.4B
—
—
16.1%
6.2%
—
$20.1B
2025
$77.1B
$3.4B
—
—
11.9%
4.4%
—
$22.0B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
METLIFE INC (MET) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
We aren't buying a growth story; we are buying a float machine.
The Power of the Float: MetLife is a master of the "float" game. They collect premiums upfront and hold the capital for decades. If they can underwrite with even a slight edge, the compounding effect of that capital is a massive tailwind.
Regulatory Fortress: This is a "barrier to entry" play. The capital requirements and regulatory red tape required to compete at this scale act as a natural moat. New competitors cannot simply appear; they must build decades of reserves.
Global Diversification: Exposure to Asia and Latin America provides a hedge. They aren't just betting on the US economy; they are betting on the global rise of the middle class and their need for retirement security.
Attractive Entry: If the business can be stripped of its "accounting noise" and treated as a steady stream of cash, it becomes an attractive utility.
Price for Interest: This becomes a Berkshire-grade asset if it trades at a significant discount to book value, allowing us to buy the float and the assets at a fraction of their replacement cost.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
"Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."
The Accounting Hallucination: Net income is a fairy tale here. When profits swing from $0.8B to $6.9B, you aren't looking at a business; you're looking at a casino where the house is guessing the rules. If the FCF is missing, the "earnings" are just ink on a page.
Structural Obsolescence: The shift from Defined Benefit (company-funded) to Defined Contribution (employee-funded) plans is a permanent erosion of their core moat. They are fighting for a shrinking piece of a legacy pie.
The "Complexity" Trap: PineBridge and the various global subsidiaries create a "fog of war." Complexity is where management hides mediocrity and where catastrophic risks (like longevity miscalculations) go unnoticed until it's too late.
The Most Likely Killer: Longevity Risk. If people live just 2–3 years longer than the actuarial tables predict, the liabilities explode while the assets remain static. This isn't a "recession" risk; it's a mathematical death sentence.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF tells us the business is a commodity; the price must reflect that.
Intrinsic value estimate: $65.88 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $49.41(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $32.94(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Based on the DCF, the stock is overvalued. We are being asked to pay for "growth" (2.3% FCF) that the business model is structurally struggling to deliver.
Verdict: PASS
The intrinsic value of $65.88 provides no cushion against the "mood swing" earnings and structural decay. The moat is merely a result of size, not a competitive advantage in pricing or product. We do not buy complexity masquerading as stability.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.