Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$3.1B
—
$266.2M
—
—
—
$1.6B
$1.3B
2017
$3.3B
—
$341.2M
—
—
—
$2.1B
$272.6M
2018
$1.7B
—
$956.7M
—
—
—
$2.3B
$186.9M
2019
$2.1B
—
$898.9M
—
—
—
$2.9B
$465.7M
2020
$2.4B
—
—
—
—
—
$3.5B
$739.2M
2021
$3.0B
—
$832.5M
—
—
—
$3.8B
$815.4M
2022
$3.2B
—
$476.6M
—
—
—
$3.8B
$572.4M
2023
$3.4B
—
$829.4M
—
—
—
$3.8B
$862.4M
2024
$3.5B
—
$882.1M
—
—
—
$3.8B
$966.0M
2025
$3.5B
—
$1.0B
—
—
—
$3.5B
$1.0B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
Match Group, Inc. (MTCH) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Digital Toll Bridge: In a world of infinite connectivity, the "singles" market is a utility. Match Group owns the most valuable real estate in human courtship: the brand. If you are entering the dating market, you start with Tinder or Hinge. That creates a de facto tax on the most fundamental human need.
Cash-Generative Moat: This isn’t a high-growth tech darling; it is a mature, cash-printing machine. By minimizing capital expenditures and focusing on aggressive extraction from the established user base, the company generates robust Free Cash Flow—$1.0B annually.
The Rational Floor: This business becomes attractive when the market confuses "lack of growth" with "lack of value." At the right price, we aren't buying growth; we are buying a high-yield bond wrapped in the form of a consumer app. We want the price where the dividend yield or share buyback capacity makes the FCF yield irresistible, regardless of top-line stagnation.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The "Leaky Bucket" Paradox: Every successful customer is a lost customer. A business that must spend a fortune in marketing just to replace the users who successfully left the platform is not a business; it is a treadmill. You are paying a heavy toll to acquire a customer who is actively trying to fire you.
Structural Obsolescence: The "cool" factor is a fleeting asset. We have seen what happens to social platforms when they lose cultural relevance (e.g., MySpace, Yahoo). If Tinder loses its status as the default app, the network effect vanishes overnight. There is no proprietary technology here, only the habit of the user, which is entirely fickle.
Acquisition Addiction: Management has clearly run out of organic ideas. The reliance on "Impairment and Amortization" expenses is a neon sign that they are overpaying for growth to mask a rotting core. When a company stops innovating and starts buying other companies to look bigger, you are at the beginning of the end.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Using the provided DCF estimate of $134.84 per share, the market is currently mispricing the risk of decay.
Intrinsic Value Estimate: $134.84
25% Margin of Safety Entry: $101.13
50% Margin of Safety Entry: $67.42
Note: While the DCF arithmetic suggests a higher value, the qualitative reality of the "leaky bucket" suggests that any model assuming 12.9% FCF growth is likely too optimistic. We would require a valuation significantly below our 50% MoS before considering a position.
Verdict: PASS
We cannot get comfortable with a business model where the primary KPI is losing your best customers. The moat is eroding, the acquisition history is a ledger of wasted capital, and we have no interest in catching a falling knife of social relevance. This is a business built on sand, and no amount of financial engineering can change that.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.