Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2017
$6.9B
$1.7B
—
—
28.9%
24.1%
$2.0B
$1.8B
2018
$9.7B
$3.0B
—
—
40.8%
31.4%
$2.0B
$4.0B
2019
$11.7B
$4.1B
—
—
44.3%
35.3%
$2.0B
$782.0M
2020
$10.9B
$2.8B
—
—
22.9%
25.6%
$2.0B
$10.9B
2021
$16.7B
$4.3B
—
—
25.6%
26.0%
$7.0B
$847.0M
2022
$26.9B
$9.8B
—
—
36.6%
36.2%
$10.9B
$2.0B
2023
$27.0B
$4.4B
—
—
19.8%
16.2%
$11.0B
$3.4B
2024
$60.9B
$29.8B
—
—
69.2%
48.8%
$9.7B
$7.3B
2025
$130.5B
$72.9B
—
—
91.9%
55.8%
$8.5B
$8.6B
2026
$215.9B
$120.1B
—
—
76.3%
55.6%
$8.5B
$10.6B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
NVIDIA CORP (NVDA) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Moat is widening, not eroding. ROE from 28.9% to 76.3% while revenue grew 31×. That’s not luck — that’s CUDA lock-in turning hyperscalers into captive customers. Switching costs? Retraining a trillion-parameter model on competitor silicon takes years and billions. They won’t.
Economics are exceptional — and improving. Net margin doubled from 24% to 55.6% while revenue doubled to $215.9B. That’s pricing power plus operating leverage. Free cash flow isn’t disclosed, but net income is $120.1B and capex is modest (no debt needed). The cash register is screaming.
Attractive entry price? Only if the market panics. At the DCF estimate of $104.37 per share (implied ~$2.5T market cap), this is a 70% discount to today’s price. That would require a 60–70% drawdown — possible only if the AI narrative cracks. If you believe the moat holds, $140–$160 (25% margin of safety above DCF) would be a generational buy. Buffett’s ideal $78 (50% margin) is fantasy unless the world ends.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Scenario #1: The CUDA compatibility crack. A hyperscaler (Amazon, Google, Microsoft) builds a chip that runs CUDA software natively — not emulated, not slower. If they undercut NVIDIA’s 55.6% margin by 30%, the switching cost evaporates overnight. This is the most likely structural threat. Timeframe: 3–5 years.
Scenario #2: The customer concentration implosion. Three customers each >10% of receivables. If one (say, Microsoft) shifts to in-house silicon or simply cuts orders due to macro or overcapacity, revenue drops 20–30%. The fixed cost base doesn’t shrink. Margins collapse from 55.6% to 20%. The stock falls 60% and never recovers to today’s multiples.
Scenario #3: The 2023 margin collapse repeats — permanently. Net margin cratered from 36.2% to 16.2% in one year, then bounced. The 10-K gives no explanation. If that was inventory writedowns or channel stuffing, the next downturn could be worse — and the bounce may not come. A 16% margin business at $200B revenue is worth $600B, not $3T.
Most likely threat: Scenario #1. The hyperscalers are already building chips. The question is when CUDA compatibility becomes a commodity.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $104.37 per share (DCF: 8% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal). This assumes the current revenue trajectory slows sharply — which it must.
25% margin of safety entry: $78.28 per share (conservative, assuming CAGR drops to 15% and margins normalize to 35%).
50% margin of safety entry: $52.19 per share (Buffett’s ideal — assumes the moat cracks and the business resets to a high-quality semiconductor company, not a monopoly).
Current price: ~$880. Overvalued by 8.4× vs DCF. Even applying a generous 2× multiple to the DCF (say $209), the stock is 4× too expensive.
Verdict: PASS
At $880, NVIDIA is priced for perfection — zero margin for error on CUDA lock-in, customer concentration, or margin sustainability. The DCF says $104, and even a 25% margin of safety requires $78. This is a wonderful business at a terrible price. Wait for the moat to prove itself through a downturn, then buy the panic.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.