Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$5.8B
$425.3M
—
$425.2M
32.6%
7.3%
—
$416.0M
2017
$6.3B
$537.5M
$550.1M
$539.9M
33.5%
8.5%
—
$689.6M
2018
$7.2B
$797.2M
$703.5M
$797.7M
44.1%
11.1%
—
$732.2M
2019
$7.4B
$878.5M
$843.8M
$876.7M
37.5%
11.9%
—
$1.2B
2020
$7.5B
$901.2M
$909.1M
$907.1M
29.0%
12.0%
—
$2.8B
2021
$9.0B
$1.2B
$1.2B
$1.2B
41.2%
13.8%
—
—
2022
$10.5B
$1.7B
$1.9B
$1.7B
49.2%
16.4%
—
—
2023
$9.5B
$1.6B
$1.5B
$1.6B
36.5%
16.7%
—
—
2024
$10.5B
$1.7B
$1.3B
$1.7B
40.0%
16.0%
—
—
2025
$10.3B
$1.3B
$1.1B
$1.3B
34.7%
13.0%
—
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
## NVR INC (NVR) — Investment Memo
### 🐂 The Bull Case *(Warren's voice)*
- **Moat is durable** because the capital-light model (no owned land, forfeitable deposits) lets NVR earn **30–49% ROE** while peers tie up billions in dirt. In a structurally undersupplied housing market, this advantage compounds efficiently.
- **Economics are exceptional** — net margins peaked at **16.7%** (2023), homebuilding operating margins at **~16%**. Zero debt means no interest risk. Pure cash flow machine with aggressive buybacks (shares down ~3.8% annually) boosting per-share value.
- **Attractive price** — DCF at **$9,014** per share assumes 9% FCF growth. If housing stays undersupplied and rates moderate, a reasonable entry is **$6,760** (25% margin of safety) or **$4,507** (50% safety) — the latter unlikely, but $6,760 is possible in a downturn.
### 🐻 The Bear Case *(Charlie inverts)*
- **Scenario 1: Lot developer collapse.** A prolonged downturn kills third-party developers. NVR walks away from deposits (limited loss) but cannot source finished lots for **2–3 years**. Revenue collapses. No land buffer to ride out the cycle. *This is a permanent structural threat, not a recession.*
- **Scenario 2: Secular margin compression.** The “cost advantage” is not pricing power — it’s low overhead. If industry-wide margins compress (labor, materials, buyer price sensitivity), NVR’s **13.0% net margin** (2025) could fall to **8% or lower**. At 8%, FCF halves. The DCF’s 9% growth assumption becomes fantasy.
- **Most likely over 5 years:** Margin erosion continues as interest rates stay elevated, affordability worsens. ROE drops to **20–25%**. Still decent, but the moat becomes normal — not worth a premium. *The model only thrives in a Goldilocks housing environment.*
### 💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
- DCF estimate: **$9,014** per share. *But that 9% FCF growth is aggressive given recent margin compression (16.7% → 13.0%). A more realistic 5% growth yields intrinsic value of **$6,200** per share.*
- **Intrinsic value estimate**: **$6,200** (conservative).
- **25% margin of safety entry**: **$4,650**.
- **50% margin of safety entry**: **$3,100**.
- Current market price ~$7,500–$8,000 — **~20% above conservative intrinsic value**. Not cheap.
### Verdict: **WATCH**
NVR’s capital-light model is elegant but its moat is narrowing under cyclical pressure and structural margin risk. The current price offers no margin of safety against realistic growth assumptions. We wait for a sharper discount or evidence that margin erosion has bottomed and the model can sustain **30%+ ROE** through a full cycle.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.