PROCTER & GAMBLE Co

PG· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 1 mo ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
1.8%
FY2015–2025
Net Income
8.5%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
2.6%
FY2015–2025
EPS (Diluted)
10.3%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
30.6%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
12.8%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
19.0%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
0.48x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$206.6B
Per Share (approx.)
$88.22
25% Margin of Safety
$66.17
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$44.11
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
3.0%
Latest FCF
$14.0B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$65.3B$10.5B$12.1B$10.3B18.1%16.1%$18.9B$8.1B
2017$65.1B$15.3B$9.4B$14.8B27.5%23.6%$18.0B$5.6B
2018$66.8B$9.8B$11.2B$8.9B18.4%14.6%$20.9B$2.6B
2019$67.7B$3.9B$11.9B$3.4B8.2%5.8%$20.4B$4.2B
2020$71.0B$13.0B$14.3B$13.0B27.8%18.4%$23.5B
2021$76.1B$14.3B$15.6B$14.3B30.7%18.8%$23.1B
2022$80.2B$14.7B$13.6B$14.4B31.5%18.4%$22.8B
2023$82.0B$14.7B$13.8B$14.3B31.1%17.9%$24.4B
2024$84.0B$14.9B$16.5B$14.5B29.4%17.7%$25.3B
2025$84.3B$16.0B$14.0B$15.0B30.6%19.0%$25.0B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

PROCTER & GAMBLE Co (PG) — Investment Memo

🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Annuity Effect: This isn't a tech company trying to capture the world; it’s a global utility for hygiene. The economics are exceptional because the consumer doesn't "decide" to buy P&G products; they buy them out of habit and trust.
  • Pricing Power is the Ultimate Hedge: In an inflationary environment, P&G doesn't just pass costs to the consumer—they redefine the premium. When people cut back on restaurant meals, they don’t cut back on Tide or Crest. That gives us pricing elasticity that few companies on earth possess.
  • The "Lollapalooza" of Scale: The sheer magnitude of their supply chain and shelf-space dominance acts as a barrier to entry. A competitor might make a better soap, but they cannot afford the marketing and distribution network to displace P&G from the minds of three billion people.
  • Attractive Range: We are looking for a business that effectively prints cash. If we can acquire this compounding machine at a price where the Free Cash Flow yield exceeds the risk-free rate by a significant margin, it belongs in the fortress.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

Munger's rule: "Show me where I'll die and I won't go there."

  • The Commoditization Trap: The greatest threat to P&G is not a recession; it is the slow, grinding death of brand equity through e-commerce algorithms. When a consumer buys on Amazon, they are presented with "Amazon Basics" or lower-cost alternatives side-by-side with the P&G label. If the differential in price becomes too wide, the "habit" breaks.
  • The Demographic Disconnect: We are betting on "brand loyalty" in a generation that treats brands as ephemeral. If P&G fails to innovate—if they are merely selling expensive soap in nicer packaging—the premium they charge will eventually collapse under the weight of hyper-efficient private labels.
  • Capital Allocation Inertia: My biggest fear is that they are "harvesting" too hard. They are buying back shares to prop up EPS because they can’t find a productive place to reinvest the capital. A business that stops growing but keeps paying dividends is just a bond that occasionally goes on sale. That is not a growth machine; it is a slow-motion liquidation.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

Based on the DCF estimate of $206.6B total value, or $88.22 per share.

  • Intrinsic value estimate: $88.22 per share.
  • 25% margin of safety entry: $66.17 per share.
  • 50% margin of safety entry: $44.11 per share.

Verdict: The market is currently pricing P&G as a growth stock, while our DCF suggests it is a mature, low-growth cash cow. We are overpaying by nearly double for the privilege of holding a legacy business.

Verdict: PASS

Procter & Gamble is a magnificent business that is simply too expensive for the growth it provides. We will not pay a premium price for the "safety" of a mature brand when the math suggests the compounding machine has already slowed to a crawl. Keep the powder dry; the price does not justify the commitment.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.