Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$1.4B
$602.7M
$29.0M
$617.4M
12.9%
42.1%
—
$698.9M
2017
$1.6B
$447.2M
$631.0M
$466.2M
10.8%
27.4%
—
$272.7M
2018
$2.0B
$1.0B
$1.4B
$1.0B
21.2%
51.9%
—
$1.1B
2019
$2.0B
$1.0B
$1.0B
$1.0B
18.6%
50.9%
—
$1.2B
2020
$2.3B
$1.4B
$1.7B
$1.4B
21.4%
61.3%
—
$2.6B
2021
$13.7B
$1.9B
$931.2M
$1.9B
26.0%
14.2%
$63.9M
$1.8B
2022
$16.0B
$2.6B
$555.8M
$2.6B
29.4%
16.4%
$77.3M
$1.1B
2023
$16.1B
$2.6B
$2.1B
$2.6B
25.1%
16.2%
$73.5M
$1.8B
2024
$17.9B
$3.1B
$1.6B
$3.1B
25.4%
17.2%
$31.1M
$1.6B
2025
$17.3B
$2.2B
$1.7B
$2.2B
17.1%
12.8%
$43.9M
$2.0B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
PULTEGROUP INC/MI/ (PHM) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Option" Moat: They aren't just buying land; they are buying options on land. By controlling 133,528 lots through options rather than outright ownership, they’ve shifted the risk of land devaluation to the seller. This is capital efficiency masquerading as a construction business.
Structural Tailwinds: We aren't betting on a "boom"; we are betting on a chronic shortage. The U.S. is millions of units behind demand. Pulte doesn't need to create demand; they just need to be the most efficient machine to satisfy it.
Institutional Bullying: Their scale provides a "cost moat." When labor is tight and lumber prices spike, the local builder gets squeezed. Pulte uses its balance sheet to secure priority and pricing, turning a commodity product into a high-margin operation through sheer volume.
Attractive Range: If the intrinsic value is truly $325.02, any price below $200 represents a massive mispricing of the structural housing deficit.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
Scenario 1: The Credit Freeze: This business is a levered bet on the mortgage market. A systemic failure in the MBS market or a permanent shift in lending standards doesn't just cause a "recession"—it kills the buyer. If the pipes of credit freeze, Pulte is left holding the bag on thousands of half-finished skeletons.
Scenario 2: The Labor Extinction: Homebuilding is a physical game. If the skilled trade labor force (electricians, plumbers, framers) continues its structural decline without a replacement, the "scale advantage" vanishes. You can't "bully" a supply chain that simply doesn't exist.
Scenario 3: The Regulatory Wall: A federal or sweeping state-level shift in zoning or environmental mandates that renders their 234,632 controlled lots unbuildable or prohibitively expensive to develop.
Most Likely Threat: The Labor Extinction. It is a slow-motion train wreck that erodes margins permanently over the next decade, regardless of how many "options" they hold.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The DCF assumes 15% FCF growth, which is aggressive for a cyclical builder, but provides a ceiling for our thinking.
Intrinsic value estimate: $325.02
25% margin of safety entry: $243.77(Conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $162.51(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Deeply Cheap. Based on the provided DCF, the market is pricing this as if a permanent impairment is already underway. We are getting a world-class land-control engine at a fraction of its productive value.
Verdict: BUY
The gap between the current price and the $325.02 intrinsic value is too wide to ignore. While the FCF volatility is disturbing, the lot-option strategy provides a sufficient safety valve against a total collapse. We buy the American housing shortage at a 50% discount.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.