Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✗EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$58.8B
$4.4B
—
—
9.5%
7.4%
$18.0B
$14.1B
2017
$59.7B
$7.9B
—
—
14.5%
13.2%
$17.2B
$14.5B
2018
$63.0B
$4.1B
—
—
8.4%
6.5%
$17.4B
$15.4B
2019
$64.8B
$4.2B
—
—
6.6%
6.5%
$18.6B
$16.3B
2020
$57.0B
-$374.0M
—
—
-0.6%
-0.7%
$19.7B
$13.7B
2021
$71.2B
$8.9B
—
—
14.3%
12.4%
$18.6B
$12.9B
2022
$56.9B
-$1.6B
—
—
-5.4%
-2.9%
$19.9B
$17.3B
2023
$54.0B
$2.5B
—
—
8.9%
4.6%
$18.9B
$19.4B
2024
$70.4B
$2.7B
—
—
9.8%
3.9%
$19.2B
$18.5B
2025
$60.8B
$3.6B
—
—
11.0%
5.9%
$18.9B
$19.7B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC (PRU) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The beauty of an insurer is the float. If you can collect premiums today for a liability that matures in 2050, you are, in effect, borrowing money at a negative interest rate.
The Power of Duration: Prudential is a massive, long-tail collector of capital. If they can manage the "spread"—the difference between what they earn on bonds and what they pay on annuities—they have a permanent, sticky source of capital.
Essential Utility: They occupy the "boring" but necessary infrastructure of global finance. Pension funds and retirees rely on their annuity payouts; this isn't discretionary spending, it is a fixed-obligation mandate.
The Scale Moat: When you are a giant, you get access to private credit and infrastructure deals the average investor can't touch. That scale creates a yield buffer that protects the underlying policyholder payouts.
The Price: At $125.65 intrinsic value, this is a boring compounder. If we could buy it at a steep discount during a panic—when the market confuses short-term accounting marks for long-term impairment—it would provide the kind of reliable cash-flow base we like to sit on.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Munger’s rule: "Show me where I'll die and I won't go there." In Prudential, I see a few ways to die, and they all involve the balance sheet becoming a black hole.
The Actuarial "Gotcha" (Longevity Risk): The entire business model is a bet on life expectancy. If medical breakthroughs happen—curing cancer or significantly extending life spans—their annuity liabilities will balloon overnight. It is an unhedgeable, systemic, long-term catastrophe.
The "Complexification" Trap: Every time management buys a reinsurance vehicle like Somerset or Prismic to "offload risk," they are just hiding the leverage in a different room. You don't get rid of risk by moving it into a subsidiary; you just make it harder for the regulator to see.
The Japan Scenario: If we enter a structural, decades-long period of ZIRP (Zero Interest Rate Policy) or negative rates, the "spread" vanishes. When the assets earn 1% but the liabilities require 3%, the equity is wiped out by the math of the deficit.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Your DCF estimate of $125.65 assumes a 3% terminal growth rate, which is aggressive for a company that effectively manages decline.
Intrinsic value estimate: $125.65 per share.
25% margin of safety entry: $94.24(The "fair value" zone for a stagnant, capital-heavy incumbent).
50% margin of safety entry: $62.83(The "cigar butt" price required to compensate for the accounting opacity and longevity risk).
Status: Expensive. Currently, the market is pricing this for growth it hasn't demonstrated, and we are not paid enough to endure the "accounting artifacts" hiding in the 10-K.
Verdict: PASS
We are not in the business of owning opaque spreadsheets wrapped in insurance policies, regardless of the yield. The complexity of their risk-transfers serves to obfuscate the truth rather than enhance it, and we prefer businesses where we can count the cash, not estimate the actuarial assumptions. We will look elsewhere for capital that works for us, not against us.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.