10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$23.6B
$5.7B
—
—
18.0%
24.2%
$10.0B
$5.9B
2017
$22.3B
$2.4B
—
—
8.0%
11.0%
$19.4B
$35.0B
2018
$22.6B
-$5.0B
—
—
-615.1%
-22.0%
$15.4B
$11.8B
2019
$24.3B
$4.4B
—
—
89.3%
18.1%
$13.4B
$11.8B
2020
$23.5B
$5.2B
—
—
85.5%
22.1%
$15.2B
$6.7B
2021
$33.6B
$9.0B
—
—
90.9%
26.9%
$13.7B
$7.1B
2022
$44.2B
$12.9B
—
—
71.8%
29.3%
$13.5B
$2.8B
2023
$35.8B
$7.2B
—
—
33.5%
20.2%
$14.5B
$8.4B
2024
$39.0B
$10.1B
—
—
38.6%
26.0%
$13.3B
$7.8B
2025
$44.3B
$5.5B
—
—
26.1%
12.5%
$14.8B
$5.5B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
QUALCOMM INC/DE (QCOM) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Toll Bridge: The QTL licensing arm is a classic Berkshire-style business. They don't just sell a product; they own the right to communicate. As long as the world requires 5G/6G to function, every handset manufacturer pays a "tax" to Qualcomm. This is high-margin, low-capex revenue that compounds regardless of which phone brand wins.
The Diversification Pivot: The shift into Automotive (Digital Chassis) and IoT transforms the company from a "smartphone play" into an "edge computing play." The car is becoming a smartphone on wheels, and Qualcomm is the only player with the integrated wireless/compute stack to dominate that transition.
High Switching Costs: Once an OEM builds their hardware architecture around Snapdragon, the cost of ripping and replacing is prohibitively expensive. It creates a sticky, recurring relationship with the world's largest hardware OEMs.
Attractive Pricing: This becomes a Berkshire buy if the market treats it as a cyclical chip company rather than a structural IP powerhouse. We want it when the "smartphone slump" scares the herd, allowing us to buy the licensing moat at a distressed multiple.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The Apple Excision: The single greatest structural threat. Apple is relentlessly pursuing its own modem. If Apple successfully vertically integrates and cuts Qualcomm out, we lose the highest-quality customer and a massive stream of high-margin revenue. It isn't a dip; it's a permanent amputation.
The "Commodity Trap": 5G is becoming a utility. If the industry shifts toward open-RAN or if MediaTek successfully erodes the premium pricing power of Snapdragon, the hardware business (QCT) becomes a race to the bottom on price.
The Bottom-Line Leak: A NI CAGR of 0.6% over a decade is an institutional failure. Growing revenue while profits spin in place suggests diseconomies of scale or an inability to pass costs to customers.
Most Likely Failure: The Apple modem transition. Timeframe: 24–48 months. If Apple succeeds, the valuation multiple must permanently compress.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The missing FCF data is a red flag. We cannot trust the NI crash from $10.1B to $5.5B without seeing where the cash actually went.
Intrinsic value estimate: $140 per share (Assumes NI stabilizes at $6B and Automotive growth offsets Apple losses).
25% margin of safety entry: $105(Conservative; protects against modest growth stagnation).
50% margin of safety entry: $70(The "Buffett Ideal"; accounts for a total loss of Apple revenue).
Current Status: Expensive. The market is pricing in an AI-driven recovery that isn't yet reflected in the collapsed net income.
Verdict: PASS
The crash from $10.1B to $5.5B in net income is a flashing red light that outweighs the licensing moat. We cannot invest in a business where the bottom line is "spinning its wheels" while the primary customer is building a replacement. We will wait for the Apple outcome to be binary and the price to reflect a $70 entry.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.