Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$816.3M
$114.9M
$158.3M
$105.2M
14.0%
14.1%
—
$18.3M
2017
$797.2M
$105.0M
$188.3M
$102.7M
12.3%
13.2%
—
$24.3M
2018
$818.1M
$64.2M
$211.0M
$65.1M
8.0%
7.8%
—
$30.1M
2019
$1.0B
$191.6M
$270.0M
$192.9M
19.3%
19.1%
—
$46.2M
2020
$983.6M
$157.1M
$257.5M
$158.8M
13.8%
16.0%
$149.5M
$62.2M
2021
$1.2B
$279.4M
$376.6M
$278.4M
22.7%
23.7%
$199.7M
$88.8M
2022
$1.7B
$583.4M
$244.6M
$585.5M
49.6%
34.4%
$199.9M
—
2023
$1.5B
$304.6M
$458.3M
$307.2M
21.5%
20.1%
$100.0M
—
2024
$1.8B
$345.8M
$555.5M
$348.7M
22.7%
19.5%
—
—
2025
$1.9B
$403.3M
$608.7M
$405.9M
22.7%
21.4%
—
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
RLI CORP (RLI) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The "Specialist" Edge: This isn't a commodity insurance business. RLI thrives in the gaps where generalists are blind. By dominating niche casualty and surety lines, they don't compete on price; they compete on precision.
The Float Engine: They are running a textbook float model. By collecting premiums upfront and maintaining disciplined underwriting, they generate a low-cost capital base to invest. The ability to grow ROE from 14% to 22.7% suggests they aren't just growing—they are getting more efficient as they scale.
Disciplined Stewardship: Management lacks the "empire-building" itch. No vanity acquisitions, no bloated overhead, and a preference for buybacks over pointless expansion. This is a business run by owners, for owners.
Attractiveness: This becomes a "no-brainer" for Berkshire if we can acquire it at a multiple that ignores the temporary volatility of insurance earnings and rewards the long-term compounding of the float.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Long-Tail Trap: Insurance is the art of guessing the future. A systemic under-estimation of "long-tail" casualty claims—where the bill arrives five years after the premium is spent—could vaporize the balance sheet. 2022’s divergence between NI ($0.6B) and FCF ($0.2B) is a flashing yellow light that reserves may be manipulated or timing is erratic.
Commoditization of Niche Data: The moat is "better data." If AI or centralized industry databases democratize the pricing of these specialized risks, RLI’s pricing power vanishes. They become just another insurer in a race to the bottom.
The "Black Swan" Cluster: While diversified, a simultaneous collapse in several niche sectors (e.g., a specific industrial crisis affecting both surety and casualty) could lead to a permanent impairment of capital.
Most Likely Failure: Reserve inadequacy. The timeframe is typically 3–7 years—the "silent killer" period where pricing errors finally hit the P&L.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $237.23 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $177.92(Conservative entry for a quality compounder)
50% margin of safety entry: $118.62(The "Fat Pitch" price)
Current Status: Fairly valued to slightly expensive relative to the DCF. Unless the market provides a dislocation, we are paying for the moat upfront.
Verdict: WATCH
The business is exceptional, and the management is disciplined. However, the current price lacks the fat margin of safety required to ignore the inherent risks of long-tail insurance reserves. We wait for a correction to the $170–$180 range.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.