10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$2.6B
$81.5M
—
—
3.0%
3.1%
$795.9M
$912.9M
2017
$3.0B
$182.9M
—
—
6.4%
6.1%
$1.0B
$696.3M
2018
$3.2B
$394.0M
—
—
12.4%
12.3%
$1.0B
$1.9B
2019
$3.5B
$448.4M
—
—
12.4%
12.8%
$1.0B
$1.1B
2020
$3.8B
$503.5M
—
—
11.9%
13.2%
$1.1B
$2.3B
2021
$4.8B
$824.9M
—
—
16.4%
17.2%
$1.1B
$2.0B
2022
$4.6B
$662.2M
—
—
12.4%
14.4%
$1.1B
$2.2B
2023
$5.2B
$522.5M
—
—
9.9%
10.1%
$1.1B
$3.4B
2024
$6.0B
$731.4M
—
—
12.9%
12.3%
$616.6M
$2.6B
2025
$6.3B
$683.8M
—
—
11.4%
10.8%
$617.4M
$2.3B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP (SF) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Why is the moat durable and why does it compound?
It’s not durable — but at the right price, it compounds slowly. Switching costs are real for clients (taxable events, family office relationships). Stifel’s $551.9B in client assets generate recurring fee income — roughly 0.5–1% annually. If markets rise at 7%, assets grow automatically. Advisory fees compound without lifting a finger.
What makes the economics exceptional — specifically?
Nothing exceptional. Incremental margins are decent (~30–40% on fee-based assets) but falling. The one bright spot: zero inventory risk — they claim “modest” trading book. Balance sheet is clean (debt $0.6B, equity ~$5.8B). In a downturn, capital isn’t at risk like a pure broker.
At what price range does this become genuinely attractive to Berkshire?
At $45–$55 per share (assuming $0.7B normalized NI, 102M shares = $6.86 EPS, a 7–8x multiple reflecting no moat and no growth). That’s a 0.8x book — cheap enough that even a mediocre business earns its keep. Below $45, it’s a liquidation play on the advisor network.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
What are the 2–3 scenarios that permanently impair this business?
Advisor exodus to a platform with better economics (e.g., LPL raising payout to 95%). If 30% of top producers leave in 2 years, the franchise loses $1.5B+ in AUM. No brand loyalty — advisors are the brand.
Fee compression in wealth management — SEC’s best‑interest rule or a price war from Schwab/Vanguard. 10 bps on $550B is $550M revenue — a 20% cut kills margins.
Balance sheet surprise — their “modest” trading inventory could hold mispriced bonds. If rates spike and liquidity dries up, a $200M write‑off wipes out a quarter of net income.
Which is most likely, and over what timeframe?
Advisor exodus is the most probable. Stifel’s payout is ~50–60%; LPL offers 90%+ for breakaway teams. Over 5–7 years, a material chunk leaves. The 2021–2025 ROE collapse from 16.4% to 11.4% shows the model already fraying.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $68 per share (10x trailing NI, no growth, no moat — generous).
25% margin of safety entry: $51(conservative — pays 8% earnings yield).
50% margin of safety entry: $34(Buffett’s ideal — 10%+ earn yield, near liquidation value).
Current price: Not provided. If trading above $70, it’s expensive relative to deteriorating returns. Below $50, it’s a watch.
Verdict: PASS
Stifel’s economics are mediocre and getting worse — the “moat” is a handshake between advisors and clients that can dissolve in months. Without free cash flow data, share count transparency, or a durable competitive advantage, there is no margin of safety at any reasonable price. Wait for a better business or a lower price.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.