Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✗Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$11.9B
$1.1B
—
—
60.3%
9.6%
$1.2B
$889.8M
2017
$15.0B
$1.7B
—
—
47.4%
11.5%
$9.9B
$204.2M
2018
$4.0B
$1.1B
—
—
29.7%
28.0%
$9.0B
$155.5M
2019
$4.0B
$1.5B
—
—
37.4%
38.1%
$8.5B
$161.8M
2020
$18.4B
$2.0B
—
—
56.2%
11.1%
$8.3B
$226.6M
2021
$19.9B
$1.9B
—
—
76.5%
9.3%
$8.9B
$165.7M
2022
$22.1B
$2.0B
—
—
65.1%
9.1%
$9.6B
$198.8M
2023
$23.1B
$2.4B
—
—
64.3%
10.4%
$9.5B
$276.8M
2024
$23.1B
$2.7B
—
—
66.2%
11.6%
$9.2B
$210.4M
2025
$23.6B
$2.6B
—
—
55.9%
10.9%
$9.7B
$207.2M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
SHERWIN WILLIAMS CO (SHW) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Vertical Toll Booth: SHW doesn't just sell paint; they own the entire value chain. By controlling the chemical plant and the retail storefront, they capture every penny of margin. It is a textbook vertical monopoly.
The "Cost of Failure" Moat: Professional contractors don't buy based on price; they buy based on reliability. A color mismatch or a peeling coat on a commercial job is a catastrophic expense for a contractor. This creates a powerful psychological switching cost that transcends brand loyalty—it's risk mitigation.
Embedded Ecosystem: The store is the hub. The proximity of SHW stores to job sites creates a "last-mile" advantage that Amazon or big-box retailers cannot replicate for the professional trade.
Attractive Entry: This becomes a Berkshire-grade business if we can buy the cash flows at a discount that ignores the current market euphoria. I want the "moat" at a "bargain" price.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Debt Treadmill: Debt has ballooned from $1.2B to $9.7B. They are using leverage to fuel an acquisition binge. When organic growth stalls, management usually starts shopping to hide the decay. This isn't compounding; it's financial engineering.
The Margin Mirage: If they truly had "pricing power," margins would be expanding. Instead, they've crawled from 9.6% to 10.9% over a decade. They are working harder just to stay in the same place.
Structural Obsolescence: The "permanent impairment" scenario is a material shift in coating technology. If a competitor introduces a 20-year "permanent" coating or a disruptive application method that bypasses the need for a specialized retail store, the storefront moat becomes a liability of expensive real estate.
The "Ghost" Cash: Net income is growing, but FCF is missing from the ledger. If the cash isn't hitting the bank account, the earnings are just an accounting opinion.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
The provided DCF is brutally honest compared to the market's optimism.
Intrinsic value estimate: $212.04 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $159.03(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $106.02(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Grossly expensive. Based on the $212.04 intrinsic value, the stock is trading at a massive premium to its discounted cash flows. We are being asked to pay for decades of perfect growth today.
Verdict: PASS
The moat is wide, but the bridge to get across it is priced for perfection. We cannot ignore the exploding debt and the stagnant margins. We pass until the market realizes that a retail store is not a magic wand for infinite valuation.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.