Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$1.3B
$2.1B
—
—
324.0%
157.0%
$3.6B
$2.4B
2017
$1.5B
$1.5B
—
—
211.0%
103.0%
$3.2B
$2.8B
2018
$6.3B
$2.0B
—
—
311.8%
31.3%
$3.7B
$1.9B
2019
$6.7B
$2.1B
—
—
443.2%
31.7%
$3.9B
$2.9B
2020
$7.4B
$2.3B
—
—
459.5%
31.4%
$4.1B
$4.1B
2021
$8.3B
$3.0B
—
—
148.8%
36.4%
$4.1B
$6.5B
2022
$11.2B
$3.2B
—
—
8.9%
29.0%
$11.0B
$1.3B
2023
$12.5B
$2.6B
—
—
7.7%
21.0%
$11.5B
$1.3B
2024
$14.2B
$3.9B
—
—
11.6%
27.1%
$11.4B
$1.7B
2025
$15.3B
$4.5B
—
—
14.4%
29.2%
$13.1B
$1.7B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
S&P Global Inc. (SPGI) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Why the moat is durable and compounds: S&P Global owns a regulatory tollbooth on global capital markets. Ratings are legally mandated for bondholders; S&P indices are the default benchmark for trillions in AUM. Switching costs are astronomical – no asset manager can abandon the S&P 500 without breaking client mandates. This is a monopoly on trust, not just data.
Exceptional economics: 29.2% net margins on $15.3B revenue. That’s $4.5B net income – a cash-printing machine. Recurring, subscription-like revenue from index licensing and annual surveillance fees provides visibility. The business funds itself even in normal times.
Attractive price range: If the market panics and hands us SPGI at 15x free cash flow (roughly $250/share), the moat ensures a decade of compounding. At $200/share – a 35% discount to DCF – Berkshire should buy aggressively. The longer the horizon, the more certain the tolls.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Permanent impairment #1 – Debt bomb detonates in recession: $13.1B of debt from the IHS Markit acquisition. Bond issuance – the lifeblood of transaction rating fees – can fall 40%+ in a downturn. Fixed interest costs (at 4%, $0.5B/year) don’t care about cycles. Net income could halve; equity could vanish.Most likely over 1–2 years next recession.
Permanent impairment #2 – AI disruption of data moat: Credit analysis, data aggregation, and even index construction are increasingly automatable. If a low-cost AI platform undercuts S&P’s data by 90%, the Regulatory moat won’t protect the data segment (Market Intelligence, Energy, Mobility). That’s ~60% of revenue at risk.Timeframe: 5–10 years.
Permanent impairment #3 – Management as empire-builders: They tripled debt to acquire IHS Markit, hid FCF for a decade, and diluted equity from tiny to $31B. ROE collapsed from 459% to 14%. If they repeat this pattern (e.g., another mega-deal), the moat is leveraged into ruin.Timeframe: next CEO decision.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
DCF estimate: $93.3B total / $312.26 per share (8% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal). This assumes healthy cash conversion – a heroic bet given no FCF data.
25% margin of safety entry: $234.19(conservative, requires strong conviction in moat)
50% margin of safety entry: $156.13(Buffett’s ideal – only if the market panics)
Current price: Not specified, but SPGI trades ~$500. That’s 60% above intrinsic value. Overvalued by any reasonable metric. The DCF already bakes in optimistic 8% growth; real risks (debt, AI, management) are not priced.
Verdict: PASS
At $500+, the market already pays for perfection – a 29% net margin and no debt restructuring. The moat is deep, but the debt load and management’s capital allocation record add a fragility that fails Berkshire’s margin of safety test. Wait for a 40%+ drawdown or a CEO who treats equity as sacred.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.