Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2017
$2.6B
$110.0M
$251.2M
$125.2M
3.9%
4.2%
—
$282.9M
2018
$2.6B
$290.9M
$292.2M
$303.8M
9.1%
11.1%
$1.3B
$201.5M
2019
$2.8B
$303.7M
$349.8M
$339.9M
9.6%
10.9%
$1.2B
$220.6M
2020
$3.0B
$407.7M
$376.0M
$390.4M
12.0%
13.5%
$1.2B
$319.6M
2021
$3.1B
$397.4M
$450.4M
$377.4M
10.2%
12.8%
$1.7B
$220.5M
2022
$4.2B
$243.9M
$397.2M
$509.4M
3.7%
5.8%
$2.9B
—
2023
$4.5B
$107.0M
$395.0M
$298.0M
1.8%
2.4%
$3.0B
—
2024
$5.1B
$378.2M
$612.9M
$583.2M
6.0%
7.4%
$3.1B
—
2025
$5.5B
$614.6M
$778.0M
$720.8M
9.3%
11.3%
$1.9B
—
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
STERIS plc (STE) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Moat durability: Switching costs are brutal. Re‑validating a sterilizer takes months, costs millions. Once a hospital installs STERIS equipment, it buys the consumables and service contracts for decades. Regulatory compliance is a permanent tailwind – no sterilization, no surgery.
Recurring revenue engine: >55% of Healthcare revenue comes from consumables + service – the razor‑blade model. $0.8B FCF in FY2025, consistently above net income. Cash flow is honest and growing (FCF CAGR 15.2%).
Pricing power: Consumables + service grew 6–8% organically in FY2025. Hospitals didn’t flinch at price increases. Operating margins in Healthcare (25%) and AST (24%) confirm it.
Balance sheet cleanup: Debt slashed from $3.1B (2024) to $1.9B (2025). D/E now 0.29x. Management is repairing, not destroying.
What makes it exceptional? Not ROE (9.3% is mediocre). Not growth (GDP‑like organic). Exceptional is the stickiness. This is a toll road – you pay to keep your OR open. At the right price, it’s a steady compounder.
Honest caveat: This is not a 20% ROE business. It’s a 10–12% ROE business that throws off reliable cash. Berkshire can own that if the price is cheap enough.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Single‑use disposables (the kill shot): If hospitals pivot entirely to disposable instruments, STERIS’s core equipment and service business shrinks. But regulatory validation for disposables is also expensive. Unlikely in 10 years. Not impossible – the trend is toward convenience, and disposables eliminate sterilization risk.
Goodwill time bomb:$1.9B of goodwill on Healthcare segment alone. Another bad acquisition (Cantel 2.0) or a sudden shift to disposables could trigger impairment. Earnings volatility is baked in – FY2023 net income was $0.1B on $5.1B revenue. That’s a 2% margin. The moat survived, but shareholder trust didn’t.
Management’s capital allocation record: Overpaid for Cantel. Earnings collapsed immediately. ROE hit 1.8% in 2023. They fixed it, but they broke it first. The next deal will test if they learned. If they lever up again, the same risk returns.
Most likely structural threat: Single‑use disposables penetrating high‑volume, low‑complexity procedures (e.g., basic surgical kits). Over 15–20 years, this could shrink the addressable market for re‑sterilization. Not imminent, but real.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
DCF intrinsic value estimate:$283.53 per share (15% FCF growth, 10% discount, 3% terminal). This assumes the recovery holds and FCF compounds. But the 2022–2023 profit collapse shows the path is lumpy.
25% margin of safety entry:$212.65 (conservative – assumes some execution risk).
50% margin of safety entry:$141.77 (Buffett’s ideal – only if you want to ignore management risk entirely).
Current price context: At ~$230 (recent range), it’s 15% below intrinsic but only 7% above conservative entry. Not cheap enough for a business with mediocre ROE and a history of self‑inflicted wounds.
Verdict: WATCH
At $230, STERIS offers a decent but not compelling entry – the moat is real, but management has not earned the trust required for a 20‑year hold without a wider safety margin. If the price drops to $210 or below, the 25% margin of safety triggers a serious look – but for now, let the cash pile grow and wait for either a better price or a clear signal that management will avoid big acquisitions. This is a fine business, not a great one, and the price must reflect that.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.