Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$4.3B
—
$2.8B
—
—
—
—
$786.0M
2017
$4.8B
—
$3.5B
—
—
—
—
$1.3B
2018
$24.4B
—
$3.8B
—
—
—
$19.0B
$2.1B
2019
$25.5B
—
$4.0B
—
—
—
$17.8B
$2.4B
2020
$32.2B
—
$6.8B
—
—
—
$21.7B
$10.3B
2021
$39.2B
—
$6.8B
—
—
—
$34.7B
$4.5B
2022
$44.9B
—
$6.9B
—
—
—
$34.3B
$8.5B
2023
$42.9B
$6.0B
$6.9B
$5.6B
12.8%
14.0%
$34.7B
$8.1B
2024
$42.9B
$6.3B
$7.3B
$6.1B
12.8%
14.8%
$31.1B
$4.0B
2025
$44.6B
$6.7B
$6.3B
$6.2B
12.6%
15.0%
$39.2B
$9.9B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC. (TMO) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Bridge: TMO doesn't bet on which drug wins; they charge a tax on every drug being developed. They provide the essential infrastructure—the "shovels"—for the entire biotech ecosystem.
The "Lock-in" Annuity: The moat isn't just a product; it's a workflow. When a scientist validates a protocol on a TMO instrument, the cost of switching isn't just the price of a new machine—it's the risk of ruining years of data and re-filing with the FDA. That is a formidable barrier to entry.
Exceptional Recurring Revenue: The "razor-blade" model transforms volatile R&D spending into a predictable stream of high-margin consumables. This creates a compounding floor for the business regardless of individual drug trial failures.
Attractive Range: For Berkshire to move, we need to stop paying for the "growth story" and start paying for the "cash flow reality." We look for entry prices that treat the inorganic growth as a bonus, not a requirement.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I'll die and I won't go there.”
The Roll-up Wall: TMO has grown from $4.3B to $44.6B largely through an acquisition binge. This is the "Law of Large Numbers" problem. Eventually, you run out of cheap, accretive targets. If management stays addicted to the roll-up, they will eventually overpay, destroying shareholder value to maintain the illusion of growth.
The "Dry Lab" Paradigm Shift: The permanent threat is a shift from wet lab (physical reagents/centrifuges) to dry lab (AI-driven protein folding and virtual simulations). If the "gold rush" moves from the test tube to the GPU, TMO’s massive installed base of hardware becomes a graveyard of stranded assets.
Cash Flow Divergence: The 2025 projection—FCF $6.3B vs NI $6.7B—is a warning light. When accounting profits outpace actual cash, it usually means aggressive capitalization or bloated working capital to hide slowing organic momentum.
Most Likely Threat: The "Roll-up Wall." Within 3–5 years, the cost of acquisitions will likely exceed the synergies gained, leading to a stagnant ROI on invested capital.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Reacting to the DCF: $150.8B Total Value / $406.03 per share.
Intrinsic value estimate: $406.03
25% margin of safety entry: $304.52(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $203.02(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Expensive. Based on the DCF, the market is pricing in significantly more than 9.6% FCF growth or a much lower discount rate. We are paying a premium for a growth rate that is largely bought, not built.
Verdict: PASS
The business is a wonderful machine, but the price is for a perfect future. With FCF diverging from Net Income and a heavy reliance on M&A, the margin of safety is nonexistent at current levels. We wait for a dislocation that brings the price toward $300.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.