T-Mobile US, Inc.

TMUS· FY2025 10-K· Analyzed 6 days ago
PASS
Growth Rates — CAGR from SEC 10-K XBRL filings
Revenue
10.5%
FY2015–2025
Net Income
31.1%
FY2015–2025
Free Cash Flow
72.2%
FY2015–2025
EPS (Diluted)
28.1%
FY2015–2025
Latest Metrics — FY2025 · SEC XBRL
Return on Equity
18.6%
NI ÷ Equity
Return on Assets
5.0%
NI ÷ Assets
Net Profit Margin
12.4%
NI ÷ Revenue
Debt / Equity
1.46x
LT Debt ÷ Equity
Intrinsic Value Estimate — DCF (10% discount · 3% terminal · FCF growth capped 15%)
Total Business Value
$644.7B
Per Share (approx.)
$585.06
25% Margin of Safety
$438.80
Conservative entry
50% Margin of Safety
$292.53
Buffett's ideal entry
Growth Rate Used
15.0%
Latest FCF
$18.0B

Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.

Buffett Quality Checklist
ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
YearRevenueNet IncomeFCFOwner EarningsROENet MarginLT DebtCash
2016$8.7B$1.5B-$1.9B$3.0B8.0%16.9%$21.8B$5.5B
2017$9.6B$4.5B-$1.4B$5.3B20.1%47.2%$12.1B$1.2B
2018$43.3B$2.9B-$1.6B$3.8B11.7%6.7%$12.1B$1.2B
2019$45.0B$3.5B$433.0M$3.7B12.0%7.7%$25.0B$1.5B
2020$68.4B$3.1B-$2.4B$6.2B4.7%4.5%$71.1B$10.4B
2021$80.1B$3.0B$1.6B$7.1B4.4%3.8%$74.2B$6.6B
2022$79.6B$2.6B$2.8B$2.3B3.7%3.3%$72.0B$4.5B
2023$78.6B$8.3B$8.8B$11.3B12.9%10.6%$75.0B$5.1B
2024$81.4B$11.3B$13.5B$15.4B18.4%13.9%$78.3B$5.4B
2025$88.3B$11.0B$18.0B$14.5B18.6%12.4%$86.3B$5.6B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation

T-Mobile US, Inc. (TMUS) — Investment Memo


🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)

  • The Modern Tollbooth: T-Mobile is no longer a scrappy underdog; it is a premium utility. Access to a mobile network is as essential as electricity, yet consumers pay for it via frictionless, automated monthly subscriptions. Once a user is set up on autopay, the revenue is practically locked in.
  • The Post-Merger Cash Harvest: The agonizing capital-expenditure phase of integrating Sprint and building out the nation's leading 5G footprint is complete. The business has successfully transitioned from an cash-devouring monster to an absolute compounding machine, with Free Cash Flow exploding from a $2.4B loss in 2020 to a massive $18.0B windfall in 2025.
  • Exceptional Unit Economics: Because the physical 5G infrastructure is already built and paid for, the marginal cost of routing an extra gigabyte of data or adding a new customer is close to zero. This operating leverage is why Return on Equity has marched upward to 18.6% in 2025, easily outclassing legacy peers AT&T (17.4%) and Verizon (16.2%).
  • High Artificial Switching Costs: Leaving T-Mobile is a psychological and financial hassle. Between equipment installment plans (EIP) that act as interest-free golden handcuffs, device locking, and the sheer dread of losing network coverage, customer churn remains remarkably low.
  • Where We Write the Check: We would happily acquire the entirety of this recurring toll-booth stream if we could buy it at a price that yields a secure, double-digit cash-on-cash return, independent of aggressive growth projections.

🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)

"All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." T-Mobile has three clear ways to destroy shareholder capital:

  • The Debt-Funded Vanity Project: Carrying $86.3B in debt while spending billions on share buybacks is not "returning capital to shareholders"—it is a dangerous financial engineering stunt. Management is taking cheap, short-term credit to prop up the stock price today, shifting all the structural tail risk onto equity holders. If we hit a tight credit cycle or if interest rates remain structurally higher, this massive debt pile becomes a noose.
  • The Stranded Asset Graveyard (The Kill Shot): T-Mobile’s moat is built on concrete, steel towers, and regulatory spectrum licenses. If direct-to-satellite cellular connectivity or decentralized next-generation protocols bypass terrestrial cell towers over the next decade, T-Mobile’s billions in physical infrastructure will become a worthless, high-maintenance graveyard. Technology is liquid; concrete is not.
  • M&A Addiction as a Cover-Up: When a mature utility cannot stop buying assets—evidenced by recent shopping sprees for Mint Mobile, UScellular, Lumos, and Metronet—it is usually trying to mask a flattening organic growth curve. This relentless, complex empire-building risks diluting focus and over-leveraging the balance sheet.
  • Structured Finance Fragility: The company's balance sheet is heavily reliant on complex EIP securitizations and factoring transactions. When a basic utility starts looking and behaving like a Wall Street structured finance desk to mask its working capital needs, long-term investors should watch their pockets.

💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety

Our base-case Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model yields an optimistic valuation, assuming management can maintain high-double-digit cash flow growth without drowning in capital expenditures.

  • Intrinsic Value Estimate: $585.06 per share (Based on $644.7B total valuation, assuming a highly aggressive 15.0% FCF growth rate, 10% discount rate, and 3% terminal growth).
  • 25% Margin of Safety Entry: $438.80 per share (Our minimum entry point to absorb the risk of their $86.3B debt load).
  • 50% Margin of Safety Entry: $292.53 per share (Buffett's preferred level, protecting us against structural technological disruption).

The Nuance on Valuation: The DCF model’s 15.0% FCF growth assumption is incredibly steep for an infrastructure-heavy utility operating in a saturated three-player market. If growth slows to a more realistic 7% to 8% due to capital-intensive 6G upgrades or price wars, the intrinsic value drops precipitously.


Verdict: PASS

While T-Mobile has successfully built an exceptional, high-margin cash engine out of the Sprint merger, we cannot condone a capital allocation strategy that pairs $86.3B in debt with aggressive share buybacks and relentless empire-building acquisitions. The intrinsic value of $585.06 per share relies on an overly optimistic 15.0% FCF growth rate that fails to account for the cyclical capital expenditures required to keep this network alive. We will patiently pass on this debt-laden utility and wait for a significant market correction to offer us a more conservative entry point.

Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management

Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.