Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✗ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✗Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✗Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✓Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$8.7B
$1.5B
-$1.9B
$3.0B
8.0%
16.9%
$21.8B
$5.5B
2017
$9.6B
$4.5B
-$1.4B
$5.3B
20.1%
47.2%
$12.1B
$1.2B
2018
$43.3B
$2.9B
-$1.6B
$3.8B
11.7%
6.7%
$12.1B
$1.2B
2019
$45.0B
$3.5B
$433.0M
$3.7B
12.0%
7.7%
$25.0B
$1.5B
2020
$68.4B
$3.1B
-$2.4B
$6.2B
4.7%
4.5%
$71.1B
$10.4B
2021
$80.1B
$3.0B
$1.6B
$7.1B
4.4%
3.8%
$74.2B
$6.6B
2022
$79.6B
$2.6B
$2.8B
$2.3B
3.7%
3.3%
$72.0B
$4.5B
2023
$78.6B
$8.3B
$8.8B
$11.3B
12.9%
10.6%
$75.0B
$5.1B
2024
$81.4B
$11.3B
$13.5B
$15.4B
18.4%
13.9%
$78.3B
$5.4B
2025
$88.3B
$11.0B
$18.0B
$14.5B
18.6%
12.4%
$86.3B
$5.6B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
T-Mobile US, Inc. (TMUS) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Modern Tollbooth: T-Mobile is no longer a scrappy underdog; it is a premium utility. Access to a mobile network is as essential as electricity, yet consumers pay for it via frictionless, automated monthly subscriptions. Once a user is set up on autopay, the revenue is practically locked in.
The Post-Merger Cash Harvest: The agonizing capital-expenditure phase of integrating Sprint and building out the nation's leading 5G footprint is complete. The business has successfully transitioned from an cash-devouring monster to an absolute compounding machine, with Free Cash Flow exploding from a $2.4B loss in 2020 to a massive $18.0B windfall in 2025.
Exceptional Unit Economics: Because the physical 5G infrastructure is already built and paid for, the marginal cost of routing an extra gigabyte of data or adding a new customer is close to zero. This operating leverage is why Return on Equity has marched upward to 18.6% in 2025, easily outclassing legacy peers AT&T (17.4%) and Verizon (16.2%).
High Artificial Switching Costs: Leaving T-Mobile is a psychological and financial hassle. Between equipment installment plans (EIP) that act as interest-free golden handcuffs, device locking, and the sheer dread of losing network coverage, customer churn remains remarkably low.
Where We Write the Check: We would happily acquire the entirety of this recurring toll-booth stream if we could buy it at a price that yields a secure, double-digit cash-on-cash return, independent of aggressive growth projections.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
"All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." T-Mobile has three clear ways to destroy shareholder capital:
The Debt-Funded Vanity Project: Carrying $86.3B in debt while spending billions on share buybacks is not "returning capital to shareholders"—it is a dangerous financial engineering stunt. Management is taking cheap, short-term credit to prop up the stock price today, shifting all the structural tail risk onto equity holders. If we hit a tight credit cycle or if interest rates remain structurally higher, this massive debt pile becomes a noose.
The Stranded Asset Graveyard (The Kill Shot): T-Mobile’s moat is built on concrete, steel towers, and regulatory spectrum licenses. If direct-to-satellite cellular connectivity or decentralized next-generation protocols bypass terrestrial cell towers over the next decade, T-Mobile’s billions in physical infrastructure will become a worthless, high-maintenance graveyard. Technology is liquid; concrete is not.
M&A Addiction as a Cover-Up: When a mature utility cannot stop buying assets—evidenced by recent shopping sprees for Mint Mobile, UScellular, Lumos, and Metronet—it is usually trying to mask a flattening organic growth curve. This relentless, complex empire-building risks diluting focus and over-leveraging the balance sheet.
Structured Finance Fragility: The company's balance sheet is heavily reliant on complex EIP securitizations and factoring transactions. When a basic utility starts looking and behaving like a Wall Street structured finance desk to mask its working capital needs, long-term investors should watch their pockets.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Our base-case Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model yields an optimistic valuation, assuming management can maintain high-double-digit cash flow growth without drowning in capital expenditures.
Intrinsic Value Estimate:$585.06 per share (Based on $644.7B total valuation, assuming a highly aggressive 15.0% FCF growth rate, 10% discount rate, and 3% terminal growth).
25% Margin of Safety Entry:$438.80 per share(Our minimum entry point to absorb the risk of their $86.3B debt load).
50% Margin of Safety Entry:$292.53 per share(Buffett's preferred level, protecting us against structural technological disruption).
The Nuance on Valuation: The DCF model’s 15.0% FCF growth assumption is incredibly steep for an infrastructure-heavy utility operating in a saturated three-player market. If growth slows to a more realistic 7% to 8% due to capital-intensive 6G upgrades or price wars, the intrinsic value drops precipitously.
Verdict: PASS
While T-Mobile has successfully built an exceptional, high-margin cash engine out of the Sprint merger, we cannot condone a capital allocation strategy that pairs $86.3B in debt with aggressive share buybacks and relentless empire-building acquisitions. The intrinsic value of $585.06 per share relies on an overly optimistic 15.0% FCF growth rate that fails to account for the cyclical capital expenditures required to keep this network alive. We will patiently pass on this debt-laden utility and wait for a significant market correction to offer us a more conservative entry point.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.