10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$15.1B
$6.0B
—
—
18.2%
39.7%
$15.9B
$5.6B
2017
$18.4B
$6.7B
—
—
20.4%
36.5%
$16.6B
$9.9B
2018
$20.6B
$10.3B
—
—
30.3%
50.0%
$16.6B
$8.2B
2019
$23.0B
$12.1B
—
—
34.8%
52.6%
$16.7B
$7.8B
2020
$21.8B
$10.9B
—
—
30.0%
49.7%
$24.1B
$16.3B
2021
$24.1B
$12.3B
—
—
32.8%
51.1%
$21.0B
$16.5B
2022
$29.3B
$15.0B
—
—
42.0%
51.0%
$20.2B
$15.7B
2023
$32.7B
$17.3B
—
—
44.6%
52.9%
$20.5B
$16.3B
2024
$35.9B
$19.7B
—
—
50.4%
55.0%
$20.8B
$12.0B
2025
$40.0B
$20.1B
—
—
52.9%
50.1%
$19.6B
$17.2B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
VISA INC. (V) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
Moat is a masterpiece of network effects + switching costs. Every new cardholder makes Visa more valuable to merchants; every new merchant makes it more valuable to banks. A bank cannot leave without reissuing millions of cards and rewiring settlement. That’s a hostage relationship, not a customer relationship.
Economics are exceptional.50.1% net margin on $40.0B revenue – that’s a toll booth with near-zero variable cost. 52.9% ROE (even if inflated by buybacks) proves capital-light compounding. Revenue grew 11% in 2025; secular shift to digital payments is a tailwind for decades.
Recurring revenue is a dream. Every swipe, tap, or cross-border transaction triggers a fee. No inventory, no product cycles, no obsolescence. International transactions are a hidden gold mine – captive, high-margin, growing.
At what price does it become genuinely attractive? If Visa trades at 20x normalized earnings (say $22B net income at 55% margins) – that’s $440B market cap, roughly $220 per share (assuming ~2.0B shares). Below $200, it’s a layup. The toll booth is on sale.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
Scenario 1: Regulatory caps on interchange fees. Already happening in Europe. If the U.S. follows, Visa’s cut per transaction gets squeezed toward utility levels. A 40% permanent earnings hit is not impossible. Likelihood: medium over 10 years. Timeframe: slow but structural.
Scenario 2: Decentralized payment rails (CBDC, blockchain). A government-issued digital dollar or a merchant-cooperative network could bypass Visa entirely. That kills the toll booth. Unlikely in 5 years, plausible in 20. Permanent impairment.
Scenario 3: Margin compression continues. In 2025, margin dropped 5 points (55% → 50.1%) with no clear explanation. If that trend persists, net income stagnates despite revenue growth. ROE declines, multiple contracts, and the “fortress” becomes a leaky shed. Most likely near-term threat.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
DCF not possible – insufficient FCF history is a red flag. Use earnings power: normalized net income $22B (assuming margin recovery to 55% on $40B revenue). Apply 25x (fair multiple for a durable but threatened moat) = $550B intrinsic value.
Per share (est. 2.0B shares): $275.
25% margin of safety entry: $206.
50% margin of safety entry: $137.
At current ~$300, it’s 9% above intrinsic – no margin of safety. Expensive for a business with a small crack in the toll booth.
Verdict: WATCH
Visa’s moat is still wide but slightly narrowing; the missing FCF and sudden margin compression demand evidence before committing capital. At $300, there is no margin of safety – wait for a pullback below $200 or clarity on cash conversion and regulatory risk.
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.