10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$15.1B
$6.0B
—
—
18.2%
39.7%
$15.9B
$5.6B
2017
$18.4B
$6.7B
—
—
20.4%
36.5%
$16.6B
$9.9B
2018
$20.6B
$10.3B
—
—
30.3%
50.0%
$16.6B
$8.2B
2019
$23.0B
$12.1B
—
—
34.8%
52.6%
$16.7B
$7.8B
2020
$21.8B
$10.9B
—
—
30.0%
49.7%
$24.1B
$16.3B
2021
$24.1B
$12.3B
—
—
32.8%
51.1%
$21.0B
$16.5B
2022
$29.3B
$15.0B
—
—
42.0%
51.0%
$20.2B
$15.7B
2023
$32.7B
$17.3B
—
—
44.6%
52.9%
$20.5B
$16.3B
2024
$35.9B
$19.7B
—
—
50.4%
55.0%
$20.8B
$12.0B
2025
$40.0B
$20.1B
—
—
52.9%
50.1%
$19.6B
$17.2B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
VISA INC. (V) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Bridge: Visa doesn't take credit risk; they don't lend a dime. They simply provide the plumbing. As the world shifts from cash to digital, Visa collects a "tax" on every single transaction. It is the purest play on global consumption ever devised.
The Virtuous Cycle: The network effect here is an iron wall. Merchants accept it because the world carries it; the world carries it because every merchant accepts it. To displace Visa, a competitor must solve the "chicken and egg" problem on a global scale simultaneously.
Exceptional Economics:
50.1% Net Margins are not just "good"—they are legendary.
An ROE of 52.9% tells us the business requires almost no new capital to grow.
This is a "capital-light" monster. Every incremental dollar of revenue falls almost straight to the bottom line.
Pricing Power: Because they are a structural necessity, Visa can nudge fees upward without risking a mass exodus of users. They own the rails; they set the price of the ticket.
Attractive Entry Range: We don't pay any price for a great business. For Berkshire to move, we need a price that reflects a utility valuation, not a tech-growth valuation.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
“Show me where I’ll die and I won’t go there.”
Scenario 1: The Regulatory Guillotine: The biggest threat isn't a competitor; it's a congressman. If governments globally mandate a "cap" on swipe fees (interchange) to "protect" merchants, the toll bridge doesn't disappear, but the toll becomes pennies. This is a permanent impairment of the profit engine.
Scenario 2: The "A2A" Leapfrog: Real-time, Account-to-Account (A2A) payments (e.g., Pix in Brazil, UPI in India). If governments force a unified, free, instant payment rail that bypasses card networks entirely, the "plastic" moat becomes a relic. The rails are replaced by a public highway.
Scenario 3: The Digital Wallet Monopoly: While Visa currently powers most wallets, a world where a single entity (Apple or Google) controls both the interface and the settlement could eventually lead them to cut out the middleman (Visa) to capture the full fee.
Most Likely Threat: Disintermediation via Government-backed rails. Timeframe: 10–15 years. It is a slow erosion, not a sudden cliff, making it more dangerous because it's easier to ignore.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Reacting to the missing FCF data: With NI at $20.1B and a capital-light model, we can reasonably proxy FCF as roughly 90-95% of NI. We treat this as a perpetual growth machine with a conservative terminal growth rate.
Intrinsic Value Estimate: $220 per share. (Based on a 20x multiple of projected FCF, acknowledging its quality but discounting for regulatory headwinds).
25% Margin of Safety Entry: $165 per share. (Conservative; protects against a mild regulatory shift).
50% Margin of Safety Entry: $110 per share. (Buffett's ideal; a "fat pitch" resulting from a market panic).
Current Status: Expensive. The market is pricing in perfection and ignoring the "public rail" threat. It is trading at a significant premium to its intrinsic value.
Verdict: WATCH
The business is a masterpiece of economic design, but the price is a mistake. We do not buy "wonderful" at "absurd." We wait for the market to panic over a regulatory headline to buy the rails at a discount.
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.