10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$7.9B
$420.0M
—
—
4.2%
5.3%
$4.9B
$870.0M
2017
$8.2B
$568.0M
—
—
5.6%
6.9%
$5.6B
$1.0B
2018
$8.5B
$695.0M
—
—
7.1%
8.2%
$6.4B
$1.0B
2019
$8.4B
$1.0B
—
—
10.2%
12.5%
$8.0B
$887.0M
2020
$8.6B
$996.0M
—
—
9.2%
11.6%
$7.9B
$2.0B
2021
$9.0B
$4.2B
—
—
31.8%
46.9%
$6.6B
$4.5B
2022
$8.9B
$1.0B
—
—
10.1%
11.4%
$6.8B
$1.3B
2023
$9.5B
$1.1B
—
—
11.1%
11.1%
$7.4B
$1.4B
2024
$9.9B
-$98.0M
—
—
-1.2%
-1.0%
$8.6B
$1.9B
2025
$9.7B
$1.6B
—
—
20.1%
16.5%
$9.7B
$3.1B
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PLC (WTW) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Booth: At its core, the Risk and Broking segment is a classic "toll booth" business. WTW doesn’t hold the underwriting risk (that’s the insurance company’s headache); they simply place the policy and collect the commission. In a world of rising premiums, their fee revenue grows without requiring a dime of additional capital.
Irreplaceable Plumbing: The "Health, Wealth, and Career" segment creates an annuity-like stream of cash. Large corporations are terrified of messing up pension payouts or employee benefits. Once WTW is embedded in the payroll and compliance architecture, they are essentially the "utilities" provider for the client. Switching costs are not financial; they are operational and reputational.
Operating Leverage: If management stops the "transformation" circus and focuses on simple, efficient brokerage, the margins here are naturally high. There is no heavy manufacturing or inventory. Every dollar of revenue gained above the cost of service falls straight to the bottom line.
Berkshire Entry Price: This is a quality compounder, but only if acquired at a price that respects the stagnation of their cash generation. We would be interested if the yield on normalized FCF hits the 8–10% range, effectively buying the business at a reasonable multiple of its sustainable owner earnings.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The Institutional Imperative: Management is addicted to "Transformation Programs" and constant M&A. This is a red flag. When management cannot grow organically, they buy growth. Buying Newfront and UpFront at premium multiples is a "lazy" way to manufacture earnings. Eventually, these bolt-on acquisitions will clutter the balance sheet and destroy value through culture dilution and integration failures.
Accounting Theater: Management is aggressively managing earnings to paint a smoother picture than reality. The gap between $4.2B in 2021 Net Income and actual cash generation suggests they are playing games with "one-time" gains. If you cannot see the cash, you cannot trust the earnings.
The Debt Trap: Taking on $4.9B+ in debt to fund "process optimization" is a fool’s errand. They are borrowing money to fix problems that efficient management should have solved for free. In a rising interest rate environment, this debt creates a permanent ceiling on the stock's performance.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Since the management refuses to be transparent with FCF, we must haircut their reported "earnings" by 30% to account for the lack of cash quality and the costs of constant integration.
Intrinsic value estimate: $260 per share (normalized for true cash-producing power, stripping out one-time accounting gains).
25% margin of safety entry: $195
50% margin of safety entry: $130
Assessment: The stock is currently Expensive. The market is pricing WTW as a seamless compounder; we see it as a bloated, over-leveraged middleman that needs a serious purge of its acquisition strategy.
Verdict: PASS
The business model has the "toll booth" characteristics we admire, but the capital allocation is an undisciplined mess of debt-fueled acquisitions. We do not pay premium prices for companies that hide their cash flows behind "transformation" jargon. Until they demonstrate an ability to grow organically without buying their way to the top, we will watch from the sidelines.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.