Berkshire requires a 25–50% discount to intrinsic value before buying.
Buffett Quality Checklist
✓ROE >15% consistently (≥7 of last 10 years)
✓Free cash flow positive (≥8 of last 10 years)
✓Conservative leverage — Debt/Equity below 1
✗Revenue growing at CAGR >5%
✓EPS growing at CAGR >5%
10-Year Financial History — SEC EDGAR 10-K Filings
Year▲
Revenue▲
Net Income▲
FCF▲
Owner Earnings▲
ROE▲
Net Margin▲
LT Debt▲
Cash▲
2016
$6.4B
$1.6B
—
—
—
25.8%
—
—
2017
$5.9B
$1.3B
$712.0M
$1.3B
—
22.8%
—
$1.5B
2018
$5.7B
$1.5B
$942.0M
$1.4B
—
27.1%
—
$292.0M
2019
$5.6B
$1.3B
$1.1B
$1.2B
—
23.1%
—
$605.0M
2020
$5.7B
$904.0M
$1.1B
$890.0M
—
16.0%
—
$730.0M
2021
$6.6B
$1.6B
$1.5B
$1.5B
—
23.9%
—
$486.0M
2022
$6.8B
$1.3B
$1.1B
$1.2B
—
19.4%
—
$367.0M
2023
$7.1B
$1.6B
$1.3B
$1.5B
—
22.6%
—
$512.0M
2024
$7.5B
$1.5B
$1.4B
$1.4B
—
19.7%
—
$616.0M
2025
$8.2B
$1.6B
$1.6B
$1.4B
—
19.0%
—
$709.0M
Warren & Charlie
Buffett / Munger — quality, moat & valuation
YUM BRANDS INC (YUM) — Investment Memo
🐂 The Bull Case (Warren's voice)
The Ultimate Toll Bridge: This isn't a chicken business; it's a legal right to a percentage of sales. YUM has successfully offloaded the "messy" parts of capitalism—labor strikes, leaking roofs, and fluctuating poultry prices—onto the franchisees.
Asset-Light Compounding: Because the franchisees fund the capex, YUM generates high returns on invested capital (ROIC) without needing to pour billions into ovens and fryers. It is a pure play on brand equity.
Global Ubiquity: KFC and Taco Bell possess "mindshare" that is nearly impossible to buy. Once a brand becomes a cultural staple in a market (like KFC in China), the royalty stream becomes as predictable as a government bond, but with inflation-adjusted pricing power.
Attractive Entry: To be a "Berkshire buy," we don't pay for "lethargic" growth at a premium. This becomes a powerhouse when the market forgets the value of the royalty stream and prices it like a struggling restaurant operator. We want it when it trades at a significant discount to the cash-flow yield.
🐻 The Bear Case (Charlie inverts)
The "Franchisee Breaking Point": The model relies on franchisees being "desperate" enough to pay the toll. If labor and food inflation permanently compress franchisee margins to zero, the system collapses. You can't collect royalties from a bankrupt operator. The toll booth only works if the road is profitable for the driver.
Cultural Obsolescence: Fast food is a fashion game. If a structural shift toward "whole foods" or a health-driven regulatory crackdown on processed meats occurs, these trademarks become expensive relics. A brand moat is only durable as long as the consumer's appetite remains stagnant.
Digital Disintermediation: As delivery platforms (UberEats/DoorDash) seize control of the customer relationship and the data, YUM risks becoming a commodity food provider rather than a brand powerhouse. If the platform owns the customer, the brand loses its leverage.
Most Likely Threat: Brand decay combined with franchisee margin squeeze. Timeframe: 5–10 years.
💰 Valuation & Margin of Safety
Intrinsic value estimate: $100.35 per share
25% margin of safety entry: $75.26(conservative)
50% margin of safety entry: $50.18(Buffett's ideal)
Current Status: Expensive. The market is pricing in growth that the historicals (2.5% CAGR) simply do not support. We are paying a premium for a "utility" that is growing at a pedestrian pace.
Verdict: PASS
The business is a wonderful royalty machine, but the price is wrong. We do not pay a premium for lethargy. Wait for a panic to bring the price toward $75.
Other Analyst Views· Lynch · Damodaran
Research Notes· Money Model · Moat · Financials · Management
Data sourced from SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (10-K only). For educational purposes — not investment advice.